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Preface 
It is part of our everyday experience that affect modulates cognition. For example, a 
typical workday at the office can change significantly depending on the current mood state. 
Imagine the following scenario: an administration secretary oversleeps, it is raining non-stop 
and on top of everything, he misses his bus. This will probably worsen his current mood 
significantly. In a negative mood, he will most likely try to avoid further annoyance and 
therefore most thoroughly attend to his daily tasks and carefully plan his workday at the office 
to prevent errors and other possible problems. In contrast, if he had woken up on time with his 
favorite song playing on the radio and the sun shining from a bright blue sky, the 
administration secretary most likely would have been in an especially bright mood. In a 
positive mood state, everything seems to be easier than on a regular day. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that he would just enjoy the moment without thinking about later, which can be 
advantageous, when an unexpected change of plans occurs. But he may be less efficient than 
usual in completing the regular tasks of a routine workday, because he most likely will be 
more susceptible to irrelevant distractions. Such everyday examples illustrate how important 
it is to investigate cognitive processes not only in isolation but also to consider affective 
modulations thereof. 
The main aim of the present thesis is to further investigate a special topic in the field 
of cognition-emotion interactions, namely the relationship of positive affect and cognitive 
control. The following introduction will present relevant theoretical concepts as well as 
empirical results, and point out open questions in this research area. Subsequent parts of the 
thesis will present original research to address some of these open questions. The thesis will 
close with a general discussion and final conclusions about the modulation of cognitive 
control by positive affect. 
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ABSTRACT  9 
Abstract 
 
Converging evidence suggests that positive affect modulates cognitive control by 
increasing cognitive flexibility. The present thesis is aimed to shed further light on this 
relationship between positive affect and cognitive control by investigating possible influences 
of arousal (Part I), dissociating between proactive and reactive control (Part II), and testing an 
increased novelty bias under positive affect (Part III). 
Arousal differences between positive affective states were manipulated by inducing 
affect via pictures from the International Affective Picture System. Furthermore, different 
paradigms including informative cues, non-informative cues, or no cues at all were used to 
dissociate between proactive and reactive control, because only in situations with informative 
cues performance can be optimized by using a proactive control strategy. Finally, an 
experiment using a Stroop-like word-picture interference task with familiar and new 
distractors was run to gather evidence for an increased novelty bias under positive affect.  
Results showed very specific influences of positive affect on cognitive control, thereby 
exceeding the existing literature: Specifically positive affect with low arousal as compared to 
positive affect with high arousal was found to reduce proactive control. In contrast, the 
present data showed no evidence for an affective modulation of reactive control. Moreover, 
Part III of the present thesis succeeded in presenting first empirical evidence for an increased 
novelty bias under positive affect with low arousal. All results will be discussed with respect 
to the existing literature on positive affect and cognitive control.
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CHAPTER 1 Background 
 
1.1.  Emotions, core affect and the circumplex model of affect 
1.1.1. What is an emotion? 
For a feasible investigation of affective modulations of cognitive processes it is first of 
all necessary to determine what is meant by terms like affect or emotion. At first sight, a 
generally accepted definition for the term emotion should not be a problem, because the topic 
of emotion is of utmost importance in everyday life and, therefore, has indeed a long history 
in psychological science. For example, in 1884 William James already published an article 
entitled “What is an emotion?” (p. 188). However, sixty-five years and even a hundred years 
later typical answers to this question still were statements like “the word ‘emotion’ is used to 
designate at least three or four different kinds of things” (Ryle, 1949/1966, p. 83) and 
“Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition” (Fehr & Russell, 1984, 
p. 464).  
While psychologists in the last decades no longer disapprove emotions as fictional – as 
has been done in behaviorism (e.g., Skinner, 1978) –, a unique definition is nonetheless still a 
work in progress. In a review on a hundred years of emotion research, Gendron and Feldman 
Barrett (2009) identified three coexisting lines of emotion theories, namely basic emotion, 
appraisal, and psychological constructionist traditions. Inspired by Charles Darwin’s classical 
work “The expression of the emotions in man and animals” (1972), basic emotion theorists 
(e.g., Ekman, 1992) suggest that there is a certain number of distinct and unreducible basic 
emotions. Each basic emotion is characterized by a specific response pattern of, for example, 
expressive behavior or physiological changes, which are assumed to be a consequence of a 
fixed biological basis. These characteristic response patterns are, furthermore, supposed to be 
adaptive reactions that are automatically triggered by appropriate objects or events in the 
environment. Appraisal theories (e.g., Arnold, 1960a, 1960b), in contrast, reject the idea of a 
reflex-like emotion elicitation by specific external triggers. They suggest, instead, that there is 
first an – not necessarily consciously aware – interpretation of an object or event, whereupon 
the outcome of this appraisal determines what kind of emotion is elicited or whether an 
emotion results at all. In this way, appraisal theories are able to explain the inter-individual 
variety of emotional experiences by different people in the same situation. Psychological 
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constructionists theories (e.g., Russell, 2003), moreover, assume that emotions – like all 
psychological states – are constructed from more basic “ingredients” or primitives that are not 
necessarily specific to emotions (e.g., arousal). The interplay of those basic components, like 
perceptions of current internal body state, processing and evaluation of the external 
environment, or actions, can result in a psychological compound that is experienced as an 
emotion. Thus, psychological constructionists consider emotions not as special entities but 
merely as characteristic patterns that are conventionally labeled with an emotional term. 
Following this point of view, emotion research should focus less on the psychological 
compound emotion but rather investigate its basic “ingredients” and their interplay.  
How challenging a unique definition of the term emotion obviously is can also be seen 
in a review by Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981): The authors collected 92 different 
definitions from the literature on emotions, and classified these based on their theoretical 
emphasis into 11 categories like, for example, cognitive or physiological. Compared to former 
reviews on definitions of emotion (Fantino, 1973; Plutchik, 1980) the authors found that there 
is an increasing number of definitions that emphasize the multi-component nature of emotions 
as well as a stronger focus on affective and cognitive components of emotion. In their 
conclusion, Kleinginna and Kleinginna proposed a working definition of emotion themselves 
with emphasis on the complexity of emotions including affective experiences, cognitive 
processes, physiological adjustments, and behavioral tendencies. More recently, Carroll Izard 
(2010) conducted a survey amongst distinguished emotion researchers on the term emotion 
and came to the conclusion that – although there is moderate to high agreement on assumed 
structure and functions of emotion – there is still no generally accepted unique definition of 
emotion. Taken together, there has been a lot of interest in the research of emotion throughout 
the history of psychological science, but there is still a lack of agreement on the theoretical 
basis. Therefore, even present textbooks of psychology still give working definitions for the 
term emotion only (e.g., Goschke & Dreisbach, 2011). 
 
1.1.2. The Circumplex model of affect 
A promising solution to this dilemma seems to be Russell’s circumplex model of 
affect (1980) – a psychological constructionist theory according to the classification of 
Gendron and Feldman Barrett (2009) –, which over the years has repeatedly proven to be a 
valid and reliable model with a strong empirical basis and high integrative value (Feldman 
Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russell, 2003; Russell & 
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Feldman Barrett, 1999; Yik, Russell, & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 
2011). Russell (1980) showed - for self-reported affect and with different scalings of affective 
words – that affect is best described not in terms of distinct categories – like anxiety or anger 
– but as a linear combination of two independent basic dimensions, namely, valence and 
arousal. Because all combinations of valence and arousal are possible – with some of them 
nameable with affect words like, for example, happy –, the affective space can be represented 
as a circumplex within a two-dimensional space (see Figure 1.1): In Russell’s model, the 
horizontal axis comprises valence ranging from negative to positive (unpleasant - pleasant), 
whereas the vertical axis comprises arousal ranging from low to high (deactivation - 
activation). The structure of affect is thus assumed to be a continuum, so that similar affective 
states like being calm or relaxed – both rather positive in valence, and low in arousal – are 
neighbors in the circumplex whereas oppositional affective states like happy and sad – both 
moderate in arousal, but one positive and one negative in valence – are approximately 180° 
apart.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The Circumplex model of affect. The inner circle represents core affect: Two independent 
dimensions valence (x-axis) and arousal (y-axis) define a Cartesian space, in which specific affective states (i.e., 
any combinations of valence and arousal) form a circumplex. The outer circle shows the typical position of 
several prototypical emotional episodes. Adapted from “Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other 
things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant,” by J. A. Russell & L. Feldman Barrett, 1999, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 76, p. 808. Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. 
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What further strengthens the assumption of a two-dimensional affective space is the 
fact, that there are several alternative dimensional models of affect besides the circumplex 
model (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1992; Thayer, 1996; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), which also 
propose two – not necessarily identical – underlying dimensions. All these models have been 
shown to be integrable with Russell’s circumplex model into a single model by a simple 
rotation of the postulated axes (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Yik et al., 1999; Yik et al., 
2011). The suggestion of valence and arousal – and not, for example, two orthogonal 
dimensions of activation (cf., Thayer, 1996) – as basic dimensions is supported by a broad 
theoretical and empirical basis. For example, Reisenzein (1994) argued that people can 
naturally apply these dimensions, when rating their own affect, while other rotations lack this 
intuitive advantage. This seems to be true not only for self-ratings of affect, but also for 
judgments of emotions in other persons: For example, facial affective expressions and affect 
in vocal tone can both be characterized as a combination of valence and arousal (e.g., Green 
& Cliff, 1975). Furthermore, physiological measures support the assumed structure of core 
affect: For example, skin conductance and heart rate acceleration systematically vary with 
subjective ratings of arousal, whereas facial electromyographic measures of corrugator and 
zygomatic activity – muscle groups associated with frowning and smiling, respectively – are 
correlated with subjective ratings of valence (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). 
Moreover, neuroimaging results suggest that there are distinct neural networks associated 
with the valence and arousal dimensions: Posner, Russell and Bradley (2005), for example, 
suggest the mesolimbic dopamine system as a candidate for a neural correlate of the valence 
dimension, whereas activity in the reticular formation is supposed to mediate arousal. Also a 
recent fMRI study (Colibazzi et al., 2010) found evidence for distinct valence and arousal 
networks: Valence was associated with activity in a neural system including the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, parts of the cingulate cortex and midbrain areas, whereas arousal was 
associated with activity in a system including the thalamus, the amygdala, the hippocampus, 
and premotor cortex (see also Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd, & Birbaumer, 2004; Lewis, 
Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007). 
 
1.1.3. Core affect vs. emotional episodes 
A common critique on the circumplex model of affect is, however, that some 
subjectively very different affective feelings, like anxiety and anger, are direct neighbors in 
the circumplex due to a rather similar – and therefore hardly distinguishable – combination of 
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valence and arousal levels. That is, Russell’s model is being criticized as being insufficient to 
represent the entire spectrum of affective experiences. Russell dissolves this at first sight 
profound caveat by differentiating core affect from emotional episodes (Russell, 2003; 
Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). The circumplex model of affect is primarily a 
representation of the structure of core affect, which is defined as a “neurophysiological state 
that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of 
hedonic (pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (sleepy–activated) values” (Russell, 2003, p. 147). 
Fear or anger, on the other hand, – that is, terms that are typically referred to as emotions in 
everyday language – exceed this most elementary affective experience of feeling good or bad 
and calm or excited. Core affect is supposed to vary over time in a free-floating manner and is 
not necessarily conscious or directed at anything. Specific emotions like fear or anger, in 
contrast, endure a certain time, are always directed at a specific object (e.g., being afraid of 
sth., being angry at so.), and include an appraisal of and attributions to that object. So, it is 
core affect plus other specific components that result in the subjective experience of being 
afraid or angry. In Russell’s framework, such a complex of interrelated components is called 
an emotional episode (see Figure 2). With this differentiation, Russell follows early 
psychological constructionists ideas that can be found already in Wilhem Wundt’s classic 
book “Outlines of psychology” (1897). Wundt assumed that at any given moment there is a 
psychologically irreducible “simple feeling” – which differs from moment to moment in 
valence, arousal and intensity levels – and that this simple feeling is only one element 
amongst others composing an emotion. Thus, an emotion is a psychological compound, for 
which this “simple feeling” (core affect) is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient. Like 
Wundt, Russell furthermore assumes that these psychological compounds, that he calls 
emotional episodes, can be classified into categories. Moreover, he argues that there is a 
prototypical cognitive structure for each emotional category, that is, a definition of the typical 
components and their temporal and causal relations within the emotional episode (Russell, 
2003; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). However, prototypical emotional episodes – that is, 
events that perfectly match a specific emotional prototype like fleeing from a wild animal in 
fear – are quite rare in real life, while non-typical emotional episodes – that is, events with 
one or more components altered or missing, but with sufficient fit to the prototype for being 
classifiable – are more common. The integration of core affect and the situational context into 
a specific emotional episode is assumed to take place in the prefrontal cortex (Posner et al., 
2005). 
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Figure 1.2. Psychological constructionists model of an emotional episode: A typical pattern of 
components, that matches a certain cognitive prototype, results in the subjective feeling of a specific emotion. 
Adapted from “Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion,” by J. A. Russell, 2003, 
Psychological Review, 110, p. 152. Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association. 
 
Taken together, core affect is a unified state of feeling good or bad with some degree 
of arousal that can be represented as a circumplex in a two-dimensional space. Even though 
some clearly distinguishable affective feelings, like being afraid or angry, are very similar in 
core affect (direct neighbors in the circumplex), they can be differentiated based on other 
components besides core affect that are part of the more complex structure of an emotional 
episode. Emotional episodes can be classified into categories, like fear or happiness, based on 
their similarity to the prototypical emotional episode of a given category. In this way, also 
basic emotion theories (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Panksepp, 1998; Plutchik, 1980) can be reconciled 
with the circumplex model of affect to some extent. The idea of prototypical emotional 
episodes with specific concepts of typical components and their temporal and causal 
interrelations is similar to the concept of basic emotions, which are assumed to have 
characteristic response patterns. The integration of basic emotion theories into the circumplex 
model of affect is a promising solution for overcoming some shortcomings of that theory. For 
example, a basic assumption of basic emotions theory is that each emotion is associated with 
a unique neural pathway. With respect to affective neuroscience results (e.g., see the review 
by Davidson & Irwin, 1999 or the meta-analysis by Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, 
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& Feldman Barrett, 2012) this is no longer tenable. There seems to be an interconnected 
network of brain regions (including, e.g., ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
amygdala, ventral striatum, anterior cingulate and insular cortex) involved in emotional 
responding that seems to respond differently to positive or negative affect, but there is still no 
proof of specialized circuits for single specific emotions. These findings are, however, in line 
with Russell’s differentiation of core affect and prototypical emotional episodes, which 
includes no assumption of unique neural pathways for every emotion prototype. Furthermore, 
basic emotion theories claim a discrete set of basic emotions, but there is still no consensus on 
the definitive number of specific emotions. For example, Panksepp (1998) assumes four basic 
emotions whereas Plutchik (1980) suggests eight. Russell’s circumplex model is able to 
include as many prototypical emotional episodes as there are reasonable prototypes. Some 
examples of prototypical emotional episodes are included in Figure 1 in the outer ring of the 
circumplex. 
 
1.1.4. Interim Summary 
Overall, Russell’s circumplex model of affect seems to be a very useful and fruitful 
description of the structure of affect that appears to be well suited to represent the entire 
spectrum of affective experiences. It is able to integrate differential emotion theory traditions 
(cf., review by Gendron and Feldman Barrett, 2009) into a single conceptual framework that 
is supported by affective neuroscience results and empirical studies. Therefore, the present 
thesis adopts the concept of affect as a combination of the basic dimensions valence and 
arousal as suggested in the circumplex model of affect. 
 
 
1.2. Cognitive control 
Cognitive control, like emotion, is another term widely-used in the psychological 
literature, but not always with the same meaning. Thus, like in the previous chapter, a short 
review is initially given on the history of cognitive control in psychology followed by a 
description of a current perspective on the topic as well as a definition of the concept of 
cognitive control that is applied in the present thesis.  
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1.2.1. Defining cognitive control 
More than a hundred years ago, the idea of a dual process system that differentiates 
automatic (synonymously often called stimulus-driven or involuntary) from controlled 
(synonymously often called goal-driven, voluntary, or executive) processes can already be 
found in William James’s classical book “The Principles of Psychology” (1890). The works 
of Schneider and Shiffrin (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) – from a 
present-day perspective classical works themselves – give a more detailed description of these 
two types of processing: Automatic processes are assumed to be effortless, fast, unconscious, 
and difficult to modify. Furthermore they are supposed to be triggered by specific stimuli in a 
reflexive manner and to work in parallel without interfering with other concurrent processes. 
Controlled processes, in contrast, are assumed to be conscious and intentional, to rely on 
limited processing capacity, and to work in a serial manner. Therefore, they are slower and 
prone to interference, but enable more flexibility in behavior. Empirical research over the last 
decades has shown, however, that human cognition is not reducible to a simple distinction of 
automatic versus controlled processes, but that there is a more complex interplay of both 
kinds of processes. For example, automatic processing seems to be triggered in a truly 
reflexive, stimulus-driven manner but only under certain conditions, namely when the trigger 
stimulus includes features that are important for the currently active goal or intention (e.g., 
Remington, Folk, & Mc Lean, 2001). Moreover, in certain situations controlled processes can 
be activated automatically and without consciousness, for example, by subliminal stimuli 
(e.g., Neumann & Klotz, 1994). According to Hommel (2007) the association of control and 
consciousness, furthermore, lacks a substantiated theoretical basis. He criticizes that the 
association is often found in the literature but seldom explained, and mostly stems from mere 
beliefs about a natural connection of control and consciousness. This sometimes culminates in 
the usage of the combined term “conscious control” without definition or justification. To 
achieve progress in the understanding of cognitive control processes, however, it is necessary 
that researchers use well-defined theoretical concepts, so that empirical studies from different 
researchers can be compared and used to draw general conclusions. 
The present thesis follows the idea of cognitive control as a basis for adaptive action 
(cf., Goschke, 2003). In this framework, processes are considered controlled only under 
specific conditions, namely when completely new stimulus-response connections have to be 
established, or when the representation of a current intention requires active maintenance 
because competing pre-dominant, but inadequate, response tendencies have to be overcome 
(see also Miller & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive control thereby faces two antagonistic challenges: 
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On the one hand, goals and intentions have to be maintained over time and shielded against 
irrelevant distractions. On the other hand, adaptive behavior must be flexible enough to switch 
goals according to internal needs or relevant changes in the environment. So, there is a control 
dilemma between stable maintenance and flexibility with a trade-off between the two 
antagonistic demands: Stability protects current intentions from competing action tendencies, 
but unrestricted stability results in perseverative, inflexible behavior. Flexibility, on the other 
hand, enables, for example, adaptive behavior in new situations, but is accompanied by 
increased distractibility. In a complex, constantly changing environment, adaptive action thus 
needs a context-dependent, dynamic balance between maintenance and flexibility. This leads 
to the question, how to accomplish this dynamic adjustment. The intuitive answer that, of 
course, “the person” is in control is just as problematic and unjustified as an unfounded 
association of control and consciousness. Alternatively, the idea of a central executive in the 
cognitive system arose analogous to the central processing unit of a computer system (e.g., 
Norman & Shallice, 1986; Baddeley, 1986; 2000), that is, a single control unit is assumed to 
monitor and regulate lower level processes in a top-down manner. For example, in Baddeley’s 
working memory model (1986; 2000) a central executive system is assumed to control and 
regulate three subsystems, namely the phonological loop – for maintenance of verbal 
information –, the visuospatial sketchpad – for maintenance of visual and spatial information 
–, and the episodic buffer – a limited capacity short time storage for integration of information 
from short- and long-term memory and different modalities. But the concept of a central 
executive cannot really explain cognitive control either, because it still gives no explanation 
about how this central executive knows when to exert control. This “homunculus problem” is 
sorted out in theories of a self-regulating control system (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, 
Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat, 2004), that is implemented in a self-organized neural system. 
 
1.2.2. A self-regulatory system for adaptive cognitive control 
The primary assumption for such a self-regulatory control system is that the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) plays an essential role for cognitive control. Cognitive control requires active 
maintenance of task-relevant representations, shielding of these representations against 
distraction, plasticity to establish new representations, flexibility for updating representations 
in case of significant changes of the situation, integration of information from different 
sources, and modulation of ongoing processes in accordance with the current goal or 
intention. The PFC has been shown to be suitable for all these functions (see Miller & Cohen, 
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2001 for a review): (1) There is empirical evidence that the PFC is essential for establishing 
new stimulus-response representations and that PFC activity dynamically changes in 
accordance with current task rules. For example, it has been shown that patients with PFC 
lesions are impaired in learning new, arbitrary task rules (Petrides, 1990), and that PFC 
activity systematically varies, when alternating between different tasks (Asaad, Rainer, & 
Miller, 2000).  (2) The PFC is not only suitable for establishing new task rules and adapting to 
changes of tasks, there is also evidence that current task representations are actively 
maintained and shielded against distraction in the PFC (e.g., Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & 
Haxby, 1997; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996), whereas distractors easily disrupt 
sustained activity in other areas of the brain (e.g., Costantinidis & Steinmetz, 1996). (3) The 
PFC has strong afferent and efferent connections with diverse cortical and sub-cortical 
structures (e.g., Barbas & Zikopoulos, 2007; Fuster, 1989). For example, the PFC receives 
widespread input from multiple sensory areas (e.g., Jones & Powell, 1970; Pandya & Barnes, 
1987), has output to the motor system (e.g., Lu & Preston, 1994) and further neocortical areas 
(e.g., Pandya & Barnes, 1987), direct and indirect connections with medial temporal 
structures associated with memory and affect like the hippocampus or the amygdala (e.g., 
Barbas & DeOlmos, 1990; Goldman-Rakic & Selemon, 1984), and a high interconnectivity 
between its own subdivisions (e.g., Pandya & Barnes, 1987). This enables both the integration 
of information from different sources and the top-down modulation of various processes. 
Taken together, the PFC seems suitable to meet both demands of cognitive control, stability 
and flexibility, but a self-regulatory control theory still needs to explain how an adaptive, 
context-dependent adjustment of these antagonistic demands is achieved in a self-organized 
manner. 
Converging evidence and computational modeling suggest that updating of 
representations in PFC is mediated by a dopaminergic adaptive gating mechanism (see Braver 
& Cohen, 2000; Cohen et al., 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001 for an overview). Without a gating 
signal, an active representation in the PFC is maintained and shielded against task-irrelevant 
input. The detection of behaviorally salient events – especially unpredicted rewards – leads, 
however, to bursts of activity in midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons in the ventral tegmental 
area (VTA), which project widely into the PFC (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). These DA 
bursts are assumed to work as a gating signal that allows input of relevant new information 
into the PFC, and thereby enables adaptive updating of active representations in the PFC. This 
gating signal is furthermore modulated by learning mechanisms (Schultz, 1997). DA neurons 
in the VTA initially fire, when a novel stimulus appears or an unpredicted reward occurs. 
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However, when a stimulus is repeatedly paired with the same reward, DA neurons no longer 
fire in response to the reward itself but to the reward predicting stimulus. Further learning is 
accomplished by systematic adjustments in DA activity to prediction errors: DA activity 
decreases with delays or absence of a predicted reward, and increases with unexpected fast 
rewards or rises in rewards (e.g., D'Ardenne, Mc Clure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). So, the 
midbrain DA system learns and gates at the same time, and thereby can optimize itself. That 
is, a novel stimulus initially elicits an exploratory gating signal from the VTA into the PFC, 
which causes an update of current representations in the PFC. If this new representation leads 
to a behavior, which results in a reward or success, reinforcement learning strengthens 
midbrain DA activity associated with this new stimulus. Thus, a future encounter with this 
stimulus will more easily again elicit a gating signal, which reactivates the PFC 
representations and the associated behavior. If this behavior still leads to a reward, the 
reinforcement of associations with this stimulus in VTA will continue. In contrast, if a novel 
stimulus is followed by non-rewarded or unsuccessful behavior, associations to this stimulus 
will be diminished, and the probability, that the same stimulus will again elicit a gating signal 
decreases. Taken together, the system is able to regulate adaptive updating on its own (cf., 
Braver & Cohen, 2000; Cohen et al., 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001). However, a theory of a 
self-regulating control system not only needs to explain how an adaptive balance between 
stability and flexibility is established, it also should be able to explain how the system 
“knows” when cognitive control is needed in the first place, and how much control is 
necessary for achieving a certain goal. 
The conflict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, & 
Carter, 2001; van Veen & Carter, 2006) assumes that conflict is a natural signal of the need 
for control. For example, in the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) – a classical conflict task, in which 
subjects have to name the ink color of printed color words – an incongruent Stroop stimulus 
(e.g., the word BLUE written in red ink) causes a conflict between the pre-dominant, but 
irrelevant, word meaning and the ink color. Therefore, cognitive control is needed to 
overcome the relatively stronger process of reading in favor of the weaker color naming 
process. The conflict monitoring hypothesis suggests that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
detects such conflicts, and signals the demand for control to the PFC. In consequence, activity 
of representations in the PFC is increased, so that task-relevant processing is strengthened. 
This hypothesis received behavioral and neuro-imaging support from several studies on 
sequential conflict adaption effects (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 
2004): A conflicting stimulus – for example, an incongruent Stroop stimulus – activates the 
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ACC, and is, furthermore, associated with performance impairments compared to a non-
conflict stimulus, because the conflict has to be resolved in order to accomplish a correct 
response. In addition, PFC activity also increases with the consequence that subsequent 
conflicting stimuli cause less interference, because task-relevant representations are 
strengthened and conflict resolution is facilitated. So in sum, the ACC appears to monitor 
conflicts and signal the demand for control, while the PFC seems to be responsible for 
implementing control. While some theorists assume that the ACC directly influences the PFC, 
an alternative theory (Cohen et al., 2004) suggests that control adjustment is mediated and 
further modulated by activity of the locus coeruleus (LC). The LC is a norepinephrine (NE) 
releasing nucleus in the brainstem with widespread projections throughout the brain (see e.g, 
Berridge & Waterhouse, 2003), which enhance the contrast of current activity patterns in the 
brain. That is, already activated pathways are further activated and inhibited pathways are 
further suppressed, which is exactly the mechanism needed within the PFC for an adaptive 
adjustments of control.  
Cohen et al. (2004) suggest that it is a phasic release of NE that mediates conflict 
detection in the ACC and control adjustment in the PFC, but furthermore assume that there is 
also a tonic mode of LC activity involved in the adaptive regulation of cognitive control (cf., 
Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b) . This is based on the 
assumption, that the conflict detection-control enhancement-loop is only adaptive up to a 
certain point. For demonstration, imagine a visual discrimination task, in which the subject 
has to decide whether two lines have the same orientation: This task is rather easy, when one 
line is oriented horizontally and the other line vertically, but task difficulty and conflict 
increases with decreasing angular difference of the lines. Increasing cognitive control can 
stabilize performance accuracy only until the angular difference is no longer recognizable. At 
this point, further enhancement of control makes no longer sense, so that control should be 
disengaged from this task, and a search for more promising alternative tasks should be 
initiated instead. That is, a self-regulating control system needs to achieve an adaptive balance 
between exploitation – optimizing current task performance – and exploration – 
disengagement from the current task, when it is no longer advantageous, and search for 
alternatives –, which is assumed to be mediated by shifts between phasic and tonic release of 
NE from the LC (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b). In phasic 
mode, there is only moderate tonic LC activity but there are phasic bursts of NE selectively to 
target but not to distractor stimuli, which optimize performance in the current task (e.g., 
Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsky, 1994). In tonic LC mode, on the other hand, 
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there is a higher level of tonic activity and no phasic responses to target stimuli, which 
impairs performance with slower reactions to targets and more false alarms to distractors 
(e.g., Usher, Cohen, Servan-Schreiber, Rajkowski, & Aston-Jones, 1999). At first sight, the 
tonic mode seems to lack an adaptive value, because it makes the system more responsive to 
task-irrelevant stimuli. However, it becomes adaptive in situations like the scenario described 
previously, when exploitation of the current task is no longer advantageous. By increasing 
responsiveness to all kind of stimuli in the environment, the tonic mode enables the 
exploration of promising new behaviors. In sum, the phasic LC mode helps in optimizing 
performance within a task, while the tonic mode helps in optimizing performance across 
tasks. As a final step for a self-optimizing and self-regulating adaptive control system it needs 
to be explained how the system comes to know whether to exploit or to explore. Cohen et al. 
(2004) assume that the conflict monitoring mechanism in the ACC can provide this 
information, given the additional assumption that the ACC is sensitive to conflict in different 
time frames. That is, in situations with only transient increases in conflict – for example, 
when being confronted with a moderate percentage of incongruent Stroop trials amongst 
congruent Stroop trials – detection of conflict increases control by activating phasic LC mode. 
In situations with constantly high conflict – for example, when being confronted with 
perceptually undistinguishable stimuli in a visual discrimination task –, however, transient 
changes in conflict no longer matter, and control should instead be withdrawn, which is 
associated with a shift into tonic LC mode. This mechanism is furthermore assumed to be 
sensitive to reward. When current performance – irrespective of conflict – is no longer 
associated with reward, LC is also driven into tonic mode (see also Mc Clure, Gilzenrat, & 
Cohen, 2006). 
Taken together, cognitive control is assumed to rely on representations in the PFC that 
lead to a modulation of ongoing processing in a top-down, goal-directed manner. PFC 
representations are furthermore suggested to be self-optimized and regulated by several 
mechanisms, including the VTA-DA system for adaptive updating of representations, the 
ACC conflict monitoring system for assessing the demand for control, and the LC-NE system 
for adjusting PFC representations in accordance with the current demands (cf., Cohen et al., 
2004). The complete neural system for adaptive regulation of control is illustrated in Figure 3.  
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 Figure 1.3. Neural model of a self-regulatory system for adaptive cognitive control. In a self-organized 
manner this system is able to adaptively maintain or update control representations in PFC, to learn how to do so, 
to determine the need for control, and to regulate the degree of control. Adapted from “A system-level 
perspective on attention and cognitive control. Guided activation, adaptive gating, conflict monitoring, and 
exploitation versus exploration,” by J. D. Cohen, G. Aston-Jones, & M. S. Gilzenrat, 2004, in M. I. Posner (Ed.), 
Cognitive neuroscience of attention, p. 84, New York: Guilford Press. Copyright 2004 by the Guilford Press. 
 
1.2.3. The dual mechanism of control framework  
Braver and colleagues (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007) recently 
suggested the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework to explain variations in 
cognitive control – inter-individual, intra-individual, and between groups. Therein, cognitive 
control is differentiated into two distinct modes, namely, proactive and reactive control. 
Proactive control means that task-relevant context information is actively maintained and used 
to optimize in advance attentional, perceptional and motor systems for an upcoming 
demanding event. Reactive control, in contrast, is assumed to be activated transiently in a 
just-in-time manner as soon as a high interference event is detected. Thus, proactive control 
works as an ‘early selection’ mechanism to prevent interference before it occurs, whereas 
reactive control works as a ‘late correction’ mechanism to resolve interference after its onset. 
Furthermore, both are associated with different neuronal mechanisms: Proactive control is 
assumed to rely on the active maintenance of task-relevant representations in the PFC, which 
are regulated by the adaptive DA gating mechanism explained above (cf., Braver & Cohen, 
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2000; Cohen et al., 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001). These maintained representations are robust 
against task-irrelevant distractions and bias ongoing processing for optimal performance in a 
top-down manner. Under reactive control, on the other hand, PFC representations are assumed 
to be activated only transiently in a bottom-up manner after detection of a demanding event. 
This is assumed to be mediated by activity in additional areas besides the PFC, for example, 
the long-term memory system in medial temporal lobe or the ACC conflict monitoring 
mechanism (cf., Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick et al., 2001; van Veen & Carter, 2006).  
The DMC framework furthermore suggests that there is a computational trade-off 
between these two control modes, so that in a given situation there is always a bias in favor of 
one control strategy over the other as a function of intra-individual, inter-individual and/or 
between-groups factors. For example, proactive control is only possible in situations, where 
predictive context information – for example, informative cues – is present, so that in advance 
preparation is enabled in the first place. Reactive control, in contrast, is not dependent on such 
in advance information and is therefore applicable to a wider range of situations. Furthermore, 
proactive control requires active maintenance of task-relevant information, which enables to 
optimize performance in this task and to reduce distractions by task-irrelevant sources, which 
is, however, resource-demanding. Thus, with longer intervals between maintenance initiation 
and utilization of the activated representation a shift towards a reactive control strategy is 
more likely, because it only requires a transient, less resource-demanding activation of PFC 
representations. These transient representations, however, are less robust against distraction 
and can also be activated by salient but task-irrelevant trigger stimuli. Thus in sum, Braver’s 
DMC framework can be understood as the neuronal implementation of the stability-flexibility 
framework suggested by Goschke (2003). Like Goschke, Braver also assumes that adaptive 
action is associated with dynamic shifts between the two control modes in accordance with a 
constantly changing environment. Importantly, not only external changes are assumed to 
influence which control strategy will be favored over the other, but also intra-individual 
changes are associated with strategy shifts. For example, healthy aging is accompanied by 
impairments in DA and PFC functioning, which result in a general preference for reactive 
control (Braver et al., 2001). Importantly for the present thesis, affect is another factor 
assumed to influence the balance between proactive and reactive control. 
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1.3. Positive affect and cognitive control 
A meta-analysis of over 150 neuroimaging studies came to the conclusion that affect is 
associated with activity in a broadly distributed system, including orbitofrontal cortex, 
anterior insula, amygdala, ACC, ventral medial PFC, thalamus, hypothalamus, ventral 
striatum, and midbrain and brainstem areas (Wager et al., 2008). Several of these areas are 
also associated with the self-regulatory cognitive control system described in the previous 
chapter (cf., Cohen et al., 2004), which is one reason why currently more and more 
researchers reject the idea of distinct affective and cognitive systems, and instead suggest 
strong interactions of or even integration of affect and cognition not only in the brain but 
consequently also in behavior (cf., Duncan & Feldman Barrett, 2007; Gray, 2004; Feldman 
Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Pessoa, 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). Therefore, affective 
modulation of cognitive control has become a special research topic with more and more 
interest over the last few years. Regarding positive affect in particular, research was especially 
influenced by the neuropsychological theory proposed by Ashby and colleagues (Ashby, Isen, 
& Turken, 1999; Ashby, Valentin, & Turken, 2002). 
 
1.3.1. The neuropsychological theory of positive affect 
The neuropsychological theory of positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 
2002) is based on two basic assumptions: (1) Positive affect is associated with moderate 
increases in brain DA levels, which, however, are not assumed to mediate the pleasant 
feelings. (2) Some cognitive effects of positive affect are due to these increased levels of DA. 
The proposed link between DA activity and positive affect is based on several sources: For 
example, unexpected rewards are known to induce positive affect and to elicit DA release 
(e.g., Schultz, 1992). Furthermore, DA agonists – that is, drugs that enhance DA activity – 
induce positive affect (e.g., Beatty, 1995), whereas DA antagonists – drugs that inhibit DA 
activity – flatten affect (e.g., Hyman & Nestler, 1993). Moreover, positive affect and DA 
release are both associated with elevated motor activity (e.g., Strickland, Hale, & Anderson, 
1975). For the cognitive effects of positive affect, Ashby et al. (Ashby et al., 1999) postulate 
that specifically DA input from the VTA into the PFC and the ACC are important. More 
precisely, they suggest that moderate increases of DA release into the PFC facilitate working 
memory, while projections into the ACC are supposed to facilitate switching between or the 
selection of cognitive sets, which might be furthermore mediated by the PFC and the basal 
ganglia. The first assumption is based on studies showing, for example, that DA agonists can 
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improve performance in a delayed matching task (Müller, von Cramon, & Pollmann, 1998), 
whereas blocking DA projections into the PFC with DA antagonists impairs performance in 
delayed response tasks (Sawaguchi & Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Sawaguchi & Goldman-Rakic, 
1994). Furthermore, this facilitatory effect of dopamine seems to be dose-dependent and 
optimal at an intermediate level (Sawaguchi & Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Williams & Goldman-
Rakic, 1995). The proposed association of DA and cognitive set shifting is based on studies 
showing, for example, that DA antagonists specifically impair performance in tasks requiring 
cognitive set shifting (Berger et al., 1989), and that patients with Parkinson’s disease, which is 
associated with degenerations particularly in the DA system, have specific deficits in 
cognitive set shifting tasks (Cools, van den Bercken, Horstink, van Spaendonck, & Berger, 
1984). In sum, the neuropsychological theory of positive affect led to the hypothesis that 
positive affect – mediated via mild increases in DA release – increases cognitive flexibility, 
which could, for example, explain the benefits in creative problem solving found in 
association with positive affect (e.g., Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994; Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985): Positive affect compared to neutral 
affect – induced via different procedures like giving an unexpected gift, watching a funny film 
clip or reading positive words – increased, for example, the probability to solve Duncker’s 
candle problem (1945), which requires cognitive flexibility to overcome functional fixedness. 
Positive affect was, furthermore, associated with more correct solutions in the Remote 
Associates Test (Mednick, 1962; Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964), in which 
participants have to find a word that is remotely related to three given probe words, as well as 
with more unusual first associates for positive and neutral, but not negative words in a free 
association task.  
The publication of the neuropsychological theory (Ashby et al., 1999) inspired several 
further studies investigating the relationship of positive affect and cognitive flexibility, which 
showed converging evidence that positive affect enhances flexibility in form of an increased 
ability to overcome predominant but task-irrelevant responses tendencies. For example, 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) manipulated affect via IAPS pictures preceding every trial in a 
cognitive set-switching paradigm. In this paradigm, participants had to categorize a target 
presented in one color, while ignoring a simultaneously presented distractor in another color. 
Dreisbach and Goschke investigated two switching conditions of cognitive sets: After the 
switch, either the targets appeared in a new color, while the former target color became the 
distractor color (perseveration condition), or the distractors appeared in a new color, while the 
former distractor color became the target color (learned irrelevance condition). The authors 
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found that mild positive affect compared to neutral affect reduced switch costs in the 
perseveration condition but increased switch costs in the learned irrelevance condition. No 
effects were found for a negative affect control group. They concluded that positive affect, on 
the one hand, helps to overcome a (predominant) cognitive set, but increases distractibility by 
new distracters, on the other hand. Thus, positive affect seems to modulate the balance 
between flexibility and stability of cognitive control (cf., Goschke, 2003) in favor of a more 
flexible but consequently also more distractible behavior. Further evidence for this conclusion 
can be found in a study by Dreisbach (2006) that shows that positive affect reduces 
maintenance capability. This study used the same affect manipulation as the previous study 
but this time in an AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) – a modified version of the 
Continuous Performance Test (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, JR., & Beck, 1956). In 
this paradigm, participants have to press a prespecified target-response key to the target “X” 
but only if it follows the cue “A”. If X follows another letter (e.g., B) or A is followed by 
another letter than X (e.g. Y), the non-target response key has to be pressed. Critically, the cue 
A is highly informative about the occurrence of X (70 % frequency of AX trials, whereas the 
other trial types BX, AY, and BY occur with 10 % frequency each), likewise, the cue B is 
also very informative, as it unequivocally predicts a non-target response. Dreisbach (2006) 
found improved performance in AY trials, but worsened performance in BX and BY trials 
under positive affect. This result was interpreted as evidence for a reduced maintenance of the 
cue, because subjects in the positive group – compared to a neutral and a negative affect 
group – showed costs when a to be maintained goal had to be executed (BX and BY trials; 
less stability) and benefits when a to be maintained goal unexpectedly changed (AY trials; 
more flexibility).  
A reference to the neuropsychological theory of positive affect can also be found in a 
study by Kazen and Kuhl (2005) that was furthermore motivated by the personality systems 
interactions theory (PSI; Kuhl, 2000). According to this framework, the selection of non-
dominant response alternatives is facilitated under positive affect (inhibited under negative 
affect) only in situations when intention memory is loaded or extension memory is highly 
activated, which is suggested to be mediated by DA activity. Kazen and Kuhl manipulated 
affect via affective prime words preceding every trial and found a reduction of Stroop 
interference after positive words related to achievement needs, but not after positive words 
related to affiliation or power needs. Compared to neutral words, negative achievement words 
even increased the Stroop effect. Following the PSI theory, these results were interpreted as 
evidence that specifically positive affect facilitates currently active intentions in a loaded 
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intention memory, which is accomplished, for example, by an achievement-related context. 
This study, thereby, extended and replicated a previous study (Kuhl & Kazen, 1999), which 
already showed a reduction of Stroop interference for the first of two consecutive Stroop tasks 
under positive affect. Having to complete two consecutive tasks in one trial is also assumed to 
load intention memory. Another study by Baumann and Kuhl (2005) found similar results 
with a different task: They used a shape detection task, wherein the target shape could be 
present on a global (dominant) or local (non-dominant) dimension and found that subjects 
responded faster to local targets after positive prime words compared to neutral or negative 
words. So, despite a general preference for global processing (Kimchi, 1992) – particularly 
under positive affect (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002) – positive prime words improved switching 
to the local dimension, whereas negative prime words increased response latency especially to 
local targets. With reference to the PSI theory, this result was interpreted as evidence that 
positive affect can facilitate the activation of extension memory, which results in enhanced 
cognitive flexibility in form of an increased ability to overcome predominant response 
tendencies.  
A more recent study (van Wouwe, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2011) is also referring to 
the neuropsychological theory of positive affect. Therein again an AX-CPT paradigm was 
used but affect this time was manipulated with emotional film clips – positive or neutral – 
prior to the actual experiment, and event related potentials (ERP) were recorded in addition to 
the assessment of behavioral data. In line with the Dreisbach (2006) study, they found 
improved behavioral performance in AY trials, that is, in trials on which a cue-induced 
response tendency had to be overcome, which also fits with the above reported results found 
by Kuhl and colleagues (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 
1999). However, unlike the Dreisbach study, the authors did not find impairments in BX and 
BY trials, where the cue unequivocally announced the non-target response. Based on these 
behavioral results and the supporting ERP data, van Wouwe and colleagues (2011) concluded 
that proactive control – which would be seen in a difference in cue usage –, did not differ 
between their positive and neutral group but that, instead, reactive control as soon as the target 
stimulus appeared was enhanced under positive affect. 
Though all above reviewed studies are motivated by the neuropsychological theory by 
Ashby et al. (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) or interpret their behavioral (and ERP) 
results with reference to this theory, they, admittedly, can only indirectly support it. More 
direct evidence for the mediating role of DA for positive affect effects comes from studies 
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investigating the relationship of individual differences in DA activity and cognitive control 
processes (Dreisbach et al., 2005; Müller et al., 2007; Tharp & Pickering, 2011). Those 
studies used the same cognitive set-switching paradigm that was already used in the study by 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004), and measured differences in DA activity via individual 
differences in two indicators for central DA functioning, namely spontaneous eyeblink rate 
(EBR; cf. e.g., Elsworth et al., 1991) and a specific gene polymorphism (D4 DA receptor gene 
exon III polymorphism [DRD4] 4/7 genotype; cf. e.g., Oak, Oldenhof, & van Tol, 2000). All 
three studies found that participants with higher central DA activity (high spontaneous EBR 
or DRD4 4/7 genotype) showed the same response pattern – with enhanced cognitive 
flexibility accompanied by increased distractibility – that was also found for participants 
under positive affect in the original Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) study, whereas 
participants with lower DA activity (low spontaneous EBR or the low activity DRD4 4/4 
genotype) behaved like the neutral affect group. Taken together, there is converging evidence 
that specifically positive affect enhances cognitive flexibility, which seems to be mediated by 
the neurotransmitter DA. 
 
1.3.2. The influence of arousal 
With respect to the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980; Russell, 2003), it is 
however remarkable that none of these studies considered possible effects of different arousal 
levels. Though the studies by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) and Dreisbach (2006) controlled 
for arousal by including a negative affect group with matched arousal levels to the positive 
affect group, they nonetheless did not investigate effects of different arousal levels. According 
to Russell’s affect model valence and arousal are, however, inseparable components of core 
affect, meaning that any person at any given moment is always in a state of feeling good or 
bad with some degree of arousal (see also Chapter 1.1.2.). Furthermore, arousal is associated 
with activity in other neurotransmitter systems besides DA like NE, acetylcholine, serotonin, 
and histamine (Marrocco, Witte, & Davidson, 1994) with emphasis on the NE system (e.g., 
Grant, Aston-Jones, & Redmond, JR., 1988; Rasmussen, Morilak, & Jacobs, 1986). The LC-
NE system, moreover, received special attention over the last decade because it not only 
mediates general arousal but moreover seems to modulate cognitive processing (e.g., Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b; Berridge & Waterhouse, 2003). More 
precisely, and as stated above, phasic and tonic LC mode are assumed to be a part of the self-
regulatory cognitive control system (Cohen et al., 2004; see also Chapter 1.2.2.). Taken 
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together, it is theoretically interesting and quite likely that this specific interaction of positive 
affect and cognitive control – namely, an enhancement of cognitive flexibility – is 
additionally modulated by arousal. 
Only recently, first studies started to specifically investigate how valence and arousal 
influence cognitive control (Demanet, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2011; Kuhbandner & 
Zehetleitner, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010). For example, Demanet et al. 
(2011) used three types of affective pictures preceding every trial as affect induction in a 
voluntary task-switching paradigm. In this paradigm, participants had to categorize a neutral 
stimulus either by identity (task 1) or by color (task 2), while using two fingers of one hand 
for responding to task 1 and two fingers of the other hand for task 2. Subjects were instructed 
to switch between tasks freely, but to try to perform each task about equally often. Affective 
picture types were neutral pictures with low arousal, positive pictures with high arousal and 
negative pictures with high arousal with the latter two matched for arousal levels. Influences 
of valence – by analyzing performance as a function of all three picture types – and arousal – 
by comparing high arousal, collapsed over negative and positive valence, with neutral picture 
trials – were investigated for global performance, task-switching performance, and the task-
repetition bias. There was no difference in proportion of repetitions in association with 
valence or arousal. High arousal, however, increased switch costs with especially fast task-
repetitions and higher error rates in task-switches following positive and negative as 
compared to neutral pictures. The authors interpreted this result in line with the adaption by 
binding account (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009), which suggests that arousal – via the LC-NE 
system – mediates control adaptation processes: Verguts and Notebaert assume that in any 
given trial binding processes – via Hebbian learning – strengthen current task representations. 
Furthermore, conflict detection is supposed to increase arousal, which is associated with a 
phasic NE signal. This NE signal is assumed to promote Hebbian learning, which 
consequently increases the binding of task-relevant representations. These strengthened task 
representations can explain why conflict is decreased in a subsequent conflict trial. In the 
voluntary task switching study by Demanet et al. (2011), the same mechanism is assumed to 
underlie the task-repetition benefit and increased switch costs under high arousal. Demanet et 
al., moreover, found that positive affect improved general task performance with faster overall 
RTs as compared to negative affect. RTs following neutral pictures were intermediate 
compared to positive and negative pictures, but did not differ significantly from either of 
them. Interestingly, valence did not influence switch costs, which was expected due to the 
hypothesis of increased flexibility under positive affect. However, the Dreisbach and Goschke 
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study (2004) showed that it is crucial to look into specific switching conditions to detect the 
costs and benefits of positive affect in task switching. Furthermore, Demanet et al. suppose 
that methodological differences might contribute to the inconsistent results of both studies: In 
their study participants switched voluntarily and more than once per block, whereas in the 
study by Dreisbach and Goschke participants switched on instruction and only once in every 
block. Moreover, Demanet et al. directly investigated the influence of affect on switch costs in 
a given trial, whereas Dreisbach and Goschke compared mean performance in the last five 
trials before a switch with performance in the first five trials following a switch. Furthermore, 
Demanet et al. used a within-participants design with a mix of positive, neutral, and negative 
pictures in every block, whereas Dreisbach and Goschke compared different influences of 
affect in a between-groups design. Demanet et al., therefore, speculate that both studies might 
investigate cognitive control processes of different time scales and that mixing positive and 
negative affect might cause carry-over effects that cancel each other out. Another important 
difference between the two studies, which is, however, not mentioned in the discussion by 
Demanet et al., is the fact that though both studies controlled for arousal differences between 
positive and negative affect, they used affective pictures of different arousal levels with 
higher levels in the study by Demanet and colleagues. Thus, an alternative or additional 
explanation for these discrepant results might be that positive affect has different influences 
on cognitive control as a factor of low or high arousal levels. Both studies, however, cannot 
clarify this assumption because they did not manipulate different arousal levels within 
positive affect.  
A completely orthogonal affect manipulation can be found in a study by Kuhbandner 
and Zehetleitner (2011). They did not use affective pictures but instead used a mood induction 
procedure including music and imagination prior to the actual experiment to elicit happiness 
(positive valence, high arousal), calmness (positive valence, low arousal), anxiety (negative 
valence, high arousal), and sadness (negative, low arousal). In their experiment, two 
components of cognitive control – amount of current control and strength of sequential 
control adaptation – were investigated with a visual pop-out distractor task. In this paradigm, 
participants had to detect and identify a pop-out target (e.g., tilted line amongst vertical lines), 
while on half of the trials a pop-out distractor was also present (e.g., a white line amongst 
grey lines), which causes interference. Amount of current control was measured by distracting 
mean RTs on trials without distractors (C) from mean RTs on trials with task-irrelevant 
distractors (I). Control adaption was operationalized by distracting mean interference on trials 
following trials with distracters (II – IC) from mean interference on trials following trials 
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without distractors (CI – CC). The typical pattern of results for this kind of sequential analysis 
is that mean interference decreases in the current trial, if control was needed in the previous 
trial (I), reflecting sequential adaption of control demands (Gratton effect; Gratton, Coles, & 
Donchin, 1992), which is assumed to be mediated by ACC activity (e.g., Botvinick et al., 
2001).  Kuhbandner and Zehetleitner (2011) found that high arousal as compared to low 
arousal was associated with less current control (more interference), which they interpreted as 
a sign that high arousal increases distractibility by task-irrelevant pop-outs. Valence, on the 
other hand, did not influence current control but control adaptation: Stronger adaption was 
found for negative affect as compared to positive affect. The authors concluded that valence 
and arousal have dissociable effects on cognitive control processes, which may be a 
consequence of different neural bases (e.g., Colibazzi et al., 2010; see also Chapter 1.1.2.). In 
line with this study, van Steenbergen and colleagues (2010) also found stronger control 
adaption under negative affect in a classical flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) with a 
similar mood induction procedure like Kuhbandner and Zehetleitner. In their paradigm, a 
central target word was flanked by two distractor words on either side, which could be 
response-compatible or incompatible to the target. Participants had to categorize the central 
target only, so that response-incompatible flanker words resulted in interference, which had to 
be resolved by activating cognitive control. Sequential analysis of the flanker task normally 
also results in a typical Gratton effect. In contrast to Kuhbandner and Zehetleitner, van 
Steenbergen et al. (2010), however, did not find an influence of arousal on current control. 
Interference effects were comparable in all four mood groups. The valence influence on 
sequential control adaptation was interpreted as further evidence for the conflict as negative 
affective signal hypothesis (Botvinick, 2007; see also Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a), which 
assumes that control adaptation happens to avoid future conflict and its negative affective 
consequences in particular. In line with emotion-congruency frameworks (cf., Rusting, 1998), 
it has already been shown that negative affect can facilitate conflict monitoring processes 
(Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000). Thus, van Steenbergen et al. (2010) interpreted their results 
as a sign that not only conflict registration but also sequential adaption may be facilitated by 
valence-congruent moods, that is, increased conflict adaptation effects under negative 
affective states. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND  33 
 
1.3.3. Interim Summary 
In sum, the reviewed theories and studies clearly show that positive affect modulates 
cognitive control. So far, the hypothesis of increased cognitive flexibility under positive 
affect, which is supposedly mediated by midbrain DA activity, gathered most empirical 
evidence. Contemporary neuroscientific theories and research as well as theories of affect, 
however, suggest that more factors might be important like, for example, arousal, which is 
associated with other neurotransmitters besides DA and activity in different brain areas. First 
studies addressing this issue already indicate additional influences of arousal. 
 
 
1.4. Affect induction and the International Affective Picture System 
1.4.1. Experimental affect induction procedures 
The selective review of studies in the last chapter already showed that there is a 
variety of affect induction procedures used in affective science (see also Coan & Allen, 2007; 
Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Martin, 1990). Different induction methods vary, for 
example, in the range of affective states that can be elicited, the intensity of induced affective 
reactions, the required administration time of the technique, or individual differences in 
susceptibility (Martin, 1990). Furthermore, this variety of affect induction procedures can be 
classified into different categories like imagination techniques (free or guided) or creation of 
an affective situation associated with, for example, success or frustration (Gerrards-Hesse et 
al., 1994). There are several kinds of affect induction methods that use simple exposure to 
affective stimuli. In this context, an affective stimulus can be any material (e.g., words, music, 
or events) that has the ability to influence a person’s core affect (cf. Feldman Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009). Most common are exposures to affective words, pictures, films or music. 
Affective film clips, for example, are able to elicit relatively intense affective reactions and 
are ecologically quite valid, because they are very complex and therefore more naturalistic 
than other kinds of affective stimuli (cf., Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). To enable more 
comparable research (at least within English-speaking populations), a set of film clips, which 
has been shown to reliably elicit specific affective states, like amusement, fear or sadness, has 
been suggested for standardized usage in research (Gross & Levenson, 1995). A disadvantage 
of using film clips, however, is that affect induction is only possible prior to the actual 
experiment and not throughout the course of the experiment, which is accompanied by two 
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problems: First, the application of within-participants designs is not possible – at least not on 
a trial by trial basis. Second, this procedure is accompanied by a great temporal heterogeneity 
in affective reactions with a strong affective activation directly after exposure, which is, 
however, fading over time. Thus, experiments using film clips for affect induction are rather 
time-limited.  
A more classical common affect induction procedure is the Velten technique (Velten, 
JR., 1968). Therein participants read self-referred statements, which are associated with 
positive or negative affective states, and are furthermore instructed to try to feel the suggested 
affective states. This induction procedure, therefore, has greater demand characteristics than 
the above mentioned exposure techniques. Furthermore, for the Velten technique the same 
methodological concerns apply that were already discussed for affect induction via film clips. 
One of these concerns is addressed in another induction method that combines affective music 
with thoughts (cf., Eich, Ng, Macaulay, Percy, & Grebneva, 2007). In this procedure, 
participants are exposed to happy or sad music and furthermore instructed to concentrate on 
pleasant or unpleasant thoughts. During the actual experiment the music continues in the 
background to prolong the induced affective state. However, to establish an intense affective 
state in the first place most participants need about 15 minutes, which is rather long as 
compared to other affect induction methods. A complete discussion of the pros and cons of 
different affect induction procedures is beyond the scope of the present thesis. Thus, the 
remaining chapter will be restricted to a discussion of the affect induction method used in the 
following experiments of this thesis, which is short presentation of pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) preceding 
every trial. More exhaustive descriptions and discussions of common affect induction 
procedures can be found, for example, in the “Handbook of Emotion Elicitation and 
Assessment” (Coan & Allen, 2007) or the reviews by Martin (1990) or Gerrards-Hesse et al. 
(1994). 
 
1.4.2. Affect induction via presentation of IAPS pictures 
 The IAPS contains a large set of color photographs from different categories like 
animals, sports or landscapes, which have been shown to reliably elicit specific affective 
reactions (e.g., Lang et al., 1993). Those pictures have been rated in several studies (cf., 
Bradley & Lang, 2007; Lang et al., 1999), so that researchers can select specific picture sets 
with respect to standardized valence and arousal levels. Those ratings proved to be highly 
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reliable with high inter-rater reliability, high test-retest reliability as well as high internal-
consistency reliability (Lang et al., 1999).  
In comparison with alternative affect induction procedures, presenting IAPS pictures 
is associated with several advantages: (1) First of all, using pictures from a standardized 
system increases comparability and replicability across different studies in affective science, 
which is essential to permit progress in a research area. (2) Picture stimuli, on the one hand, 
are more complex and therefore more naturalistic than, for example, word stimuli, while, on 
the other hand, they are static, which makes them more controllable than dynamic stimuli like 
films. (3) Pictures are language-free, which makes them applicable across different cultures 
and throughout the lifespan, whereas using affective words, for example, is challenged by 
translation problems and the need of reading skills. (4) Affective pictures are effective almost 
instantaneously. Even very short presentation durations reliably elicit specific affective 
reactions (Codispoti, Bradley, & Lang, 2001; Codispoti, Mazzeti, & Bradley, 2009) with little 
difference to longer presentation durations: Typical affective reactions can be found already 
following a 25 ms exposure time or 80 ms, when pictures are directly followed by a mask. 
This enables much faster experimental procedures than other affect induction procedures. 
IAPS pictures, for example, can be presented shortly before every single trial without 
prolonging the experiment to an unreasonable extent. Furthermore, the instantaneous effect of 
IAPS pictures makes them also applicable in within-participants designs, which are not 
feasible with more time-consuming affect induction procedures like, for example, the Velten 
technique. (5) Repetitive exposure to pictures of the same valence is associated with 
maintained or even sensitized – but not habituated – affective reactions (Bradley, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1996; Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2005). Therefore, presentation of positive or negative 
IAPS pictures preceding every trial seems better suited for investigating affective influences 
throughout the course of an experiment than induction procedures, which induce affect prior 
to the actual experiment. (6) Importantly for the present thesis, the standardized valence and 
arousal norms included in the IAPS enable the systematic investigation of both dimensions of 
affect. Though Lang and colleagues (Lang et al., 1999) tried to find pictures for the whole 
continuum of affective states, a few caveats are nonetheless associated with the IAPS 
affective space: Neutral affective pictures are restricted to rather low arousal levels. Positive 
and negative pictures show a trend for increasing arousal levels with more extreme valence 
levels, while this relationship is especially pronounced for negative stimuli (cf., Bradley 
& Lang, 2007; Lang et al., 1999). This pattern, however, might simply be a reflection of real 
world experiences, namely that emotional intense – and especially highly aversive – objects 
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and events naturally go along with high arousal. For example, the fact that negative stimuli 
can be evaluated faster when they are high in arousal compared to low arousing negative 
stimuli (Robinson, Storbeck, Meier, & Kirkeby, 2004) strengthens this assumption of a 
natural relationship between negative affect and arousal. Furthermore, positive pictures with 
high arousal include the category of erotica, which are associated with gender differences and 
effects that are untypical for other highly arousing positive pictures (Most, Smith, Cooter, 
Levy, & Zald, 2007). These caveats should be taken account of when selecting IAPS picture 
sets for an experiment. But overall, the presentation of IAPS pictures seems a well suited 
affect induction method for investigating the research questions addressed in the present 
thesis, which will be introduced in the next chapter. 
 
 
1.5. Scope of the present thesis 
The main aim of this thesis is to further investigate how positive affect modulates 
cognitive control. One might argue that it is more important to investigate effects of negative 
affect, because results might be relevant for affective disorders like depression or anxiety 
disorder, but positive affect effects are no less important and seem to be especially relevant in 
association with everyday behavior. In a healthy person, affective state during a normal day is 
more likely to fluctuate from neutral to positive affect, for example, due to hearing a cheerful 
song on the radio or getting a surprise call from a good friend.  
In the last years there has been a strong focus in research – inspired by the 
neuropsychological theory by Ashby and colleagues (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) – 
on the hypothesis that specifically positive affect – mediated via DA activity – increases 
cognitive flexibility (e.g., Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 
2004; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999; van Wouwe et al., 2011). The majority of 
these studies included a negative affect control condition, and could indeed show a valence 
specific enhancement in cognitive flexibility under positive affect. This increase in flexibility 
seems to be accompanied by increased distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and 
reduced maintenance capability (Dreisbach, 2006), which supports the stability-flexibility 
framework of cognitive control (cf. Goschke, 2003). With respect to the circumplex model of 
affect (Russell, 1980; Russell, 2003) research on specific affect effects should, however, also 
investigate influences of arousal, because both valence and arousal are inseparable 
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components of affect. Furthermore, arousal is associated with activity of the neurotransmitter 
NE (e.g., Grant et al., 1988), which also has a modulatory effect on cognitive control 
according to current theories (cf., Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005b; Cohen et al., 2004). A few recent studies (Demanet et al., 2011; Kuhbandner 
& Zehetleitner, 2011; van Steenbergen et al., 2010) already indicate that not only valence but 
also arousal influences cognitive control processes, but so far with rather mixed results. 
Therefore, the main aim of Part I of the present thesis is to further investigate, whether 
cognitive control is differently modulated by positive affect with low or high arousal levels. 
According to the DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007) cognitive 
control can be differentiated into proactive and reactive control. With this framework in mind, 
two kinds of cognitive flexibility are feasible: The classical point of view, that is, flexibility in 
form of an increased ability to overcome pre-dominant response tendencies, corresponds to an 
increase in reactive control. But a reduction of proactive control can also be interpreted as 
increased flexibility, because less proactive control means that the behavior is less dependent 
on advance information. When classifying the existing literature, evidence for both kinds of 
flexibility can be found. For example, the results by Bauman & Kuhl (2005) could be 
interpreted as flexibility in form of increased reactive control, while the results by Dreisbach 
(2006) would fit with the interpretation of increased flexibility in terms of reduced proactive 
control. Therefore, Part II of the present thesis directly investigates, whether positive affect 
influences proactive or reactive control. Furthermore, the arousal effect examined in Part I 
will be replicated with different paradigms. 
Favoring flexibility in the stability-flexibility balance of cognitive control is associated 
with a behavioral trade-off (cf., Goschke, 2003). Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of 
positive affect effects should not neglect the costs of an increase in cognitive flexibility. For 
example, Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) showed that increased flexibility under positive 
affect reduces perseveration, but at the same time enhances distractibility. The authors 
furthermore suggested that this increased distractibility is a consequence of an increased 
novelty bias under positive affect. That is, positive affect is assumed to promote susceptibility 
towards novel stimuli. This specific hypothesis has, however, not been directly addressed in 
an empirical investigation so far. Therefore, Part III of the present thesis is aimed to find 
evidence for an increased novelty bias under positive affect. 
The final section of this thesis will give a general discussion on the influences of 
positive affect on cognitive control. Therein, results from the original research presented in 
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Parts I to III are discussed with respect to neuropsychological theories, theories on the 
functionality of positive affect, and current theories on cognitive control. Focus will be on the 
specificity of positive affect effects depending on, for example, different arousal levels or 
induction procedures. Furthermore, suggestions for future research are given, which might 
help in further clarifying the relationship between positive affect and cognitive control and in 
dissolving mixed results in the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Part I: How positive affect modulates cognitive control: The role 
of arousal 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Several empirical studies showed a valence specific effect – probably mediated via 
DA activity (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) – of increased flexibility under positive 
affect (see Chapter 1.3.1.). So far, however, little is known about possible additional 
influences of arousal. Arousal is also an inherent component of affect (Russell, 1980; Russell, 
2003) and is, furthermore, supposed to modulate cognitive control processes via NE activity 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b; Cohen et al., 2004). Therefore, 
the main aim of the first experiment of the present thesis is to investigate, whether affective 
modulation of cognitive control differs for positive affect with low or high arousal. 
Conflict tasks are a common method for examining enhanced flexibility of cognitive 
control. Conflict can, for example, be manipulated within a given target stimulus as is the case 
in the Stroop task: Incongruent Stroop trials, like the color word BLUE written in red ink, 
cause a response conflict between the pre-dominant response tendency of reading and the 
relevant color naming task. Cognitive control is needed to resolve this conflict, which slows 
down RTs as compared to congruent Stroop trials (e.g., BLUE written in blue ink). An 
increase in cognitive flexibility should reduce this interference effect, because switching to 
the non-dominant, but correct response should be facilitated. Conflict can also be manipulated 
between a cue and a subsequent target as is the case in the AX-CPT: Therein a response 
conflict results when expectations are violated. The presentation of the cue A, for example, 
automatically activates the corresponding response for an AX trial due to the high frequency 
of AX trials. If A, however, is followed by another letter than X, a different response would 
be correct. This unexpected change of task demands induces a response conflict that needs to 
be overcome. Conflict resolution should again be facilitated with increased cognitive 
flexibility.  
Experiment 1 of the present thesis also uses a conflict task, namely a spatial response 
cueing task with informative cues. In this paradigm, a peripheral target has to be responded 
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with a spatially corresponding response key. The target is preceded by an also peripheral, 
informative cue. That is, the cue correctly indicates the possible target location with a 
probability of more than 50 % but less than 100 %. Responses in validly cued trials are 
facilitated because the spatial orientation of the cue automatically biases response selection 
towards the spatially corresponding response (Adam & Pratt, 2008; Wilson & Pratt, 2007). 
This automatic response tendency is furthermore sustained due to the informational value of 
the cue – and the associated expectations (Eimer, 1995; Eimer, Hommel, & Prinz, 1995). 
Invalid cues, on the other hand, cause task interference, because there is a response conflict 
between the pre-dominant, cue-congruent response and the correct response. This typical 
response pattern – response benefits following valid cues and costs following invalid cues – is 
called cue validity effect (CVE). An increase in cognitive flexibility is expected to reduce the 
CVE, because conflict resolution in invalid trials should be facilitated. 
Two studies that controlled for arousal (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) 
found converging evidence that specifically positive affect – manipulated via IAPS pictures 
preceding every trial – increases cognitive flexibility. Both studies found no difference 
between a negative affect group and a neutral affect control group, while using an IAPS 
picture selection of positive and negative pictures with rather low (matched) arousal levels. 
Demanet et al. (2011) used IAPS pictures with higher arousal levels and found also a specific 
positive affect effect, but furthermore increased switch costs following highly arousing 
affective pictures – positive and negative – as compared to neutral pictures. Taken together, 
these studies indicate – in line with Russell’s circumplex model of affect ((Russell, 1980; 
Russell, 2003) – that valence and arousal should both be considered when investigating 
affective modulations of cognitive control. However, the differences in paradigms used in 
these studies (see Chapter 1.3.2.) prevent strong conclusions about specific influences of 
valence or arousal at this point. Therefore, Experiment 1 was aimed to directly investigate 
how positive affect with low or high arousal influences cognitive control. To be able to 
manipulate valence and arousal independently, affect in the present study was also 
manipulated via IAPS pictures preceding every trial (see Chapter 1.4.2. for further advantages 
of this method). Four affective picture sets were chosen: (1) Neutral pictures with medium 
valence and low arousal levels for a control group. (2) Highly positive pictures with rather 
low arousal levels (positivelow hereafter) comparable to those used in previous studies 
(Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) to replicate the influence of positive affect on 
cognitive flexibility. (3) Another positive picture set with high arousal levels (positivehigh 
hereafter). (4) Highly negative pictures with high arousal levels (negativehigh hereafter), which 
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were matched to the positivehigh picture set, to control for negative affect effects. Negative 
pictures with low arousal were not included in the experiment, because this category did not 
differ from a neutral affect control condition in previous studies (cf., Dreisbach, 2006; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). 
 
 
2.2. Experiment 1: Spatial response cueing with informative cues 
In line with the neuropsychological theory of positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999; 
Ashby et al., 2002) and previous empirical studies (e.g., Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Dreisbach, 
2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999), positive 
affect with low arousal was expected to increase cognitive flexibility in form of a reduced 
CVE. According to Ashby and colleagues this effect is mediated by DA activity and therefore 
specific for positive affect and not attributable to arousal influences, which are assumed to be 
primarily mediated by NE activity (e.g., Grant et al., 1988). Based on the existing literature, 
different predictions are feasible for the positivehigh group: Positive affect could increase 
cognitive flexibility – mediated via DA – irrespective of different arousal levels. This would 
mean that the CVE should also be reduced in the positivehigh group. However, not only DA 
but also NE activity is supposed to modulate cognitive control (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a; 
Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b; Cohen et al., 2004). Therefore, the modulatory effect of NE 
might influence the DA effect leading to a performance difference between positive affect 
with low and high arousal levels. The negativehigh group is primarily another control group 
besides the neutral group to see if highly arousing negative affect – in contrast to low arousing 
negative affect (cf., Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) – influences cognitive 
control performance. Furthermore, a previous study also using positive and negative highly 
arousing pictures (Demanet et al., 2011) found a valence effect with generally faster RTs 
under positive affect using a within-participants affect manipulation. Therefore, the 
comparison between the positivehigh and negativehigh group of the present study will show, 
whether this holds true in a between-groups design. 
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2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants  
Eighty-seven undergraduate students of Regensburg University participated in the 
experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Eighty-three subjects (see Results for exclusion 
criteria) were included into the final data analysis (Mean age = 23.96 years, SD = 3.89, range 
= 19-38, 71 female). Participants were assigned randomly to the four affect groups (19 
neutral, 21 positivelow, 22 positivehigh, 21 negativehigh). All participants signed informed 
consent and were debriefed after the session. 
2.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli  
A computer with a 17-inch-monitor (display resolution at 1024 x 768 pixel), running 
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, USA) was used for experiment 
presentation and data acquisition. Viewing distance was held constant at 50 cm by using a 
chin rest. Responses were collected via a QWERTZ-keyboard, with the y- and m-key serving 
as left and right response keys. 
 For all four affect conditions, 10 IAPS pictures were selected for affect induction. 
Those pictures were all presented in landscape format and color, adjusted to a size of 800 x 
600 pixels, and positioned centered on a grey background. Mean valence and arousal levels of 
the four picture sets can be seen in Table 2.1 (see Apendix A for IAPS picture numbers). 
Neutral pictures included household objects like plates or cups, positivelow pictures showed 
babies and families, in the positivehigh group sport and adventure pictures were displayed, and 
negativehigh pictures showed mutilated bodies and accident scenes. No erotica were used in the 
positivehigh group to prevent different gender influences (see also Most et al., 2007).  
 
Table 2.1. Mean valence and arousal levels (SD in parentheses) for the four IAPS picture sets 
Picture set neutral positivelow positivehigh negativehigh 
Valence M (SD) 4.99 (0.17) 7.99 (0.24) 7.25 (0.42) 1.75 (0.17) 
Arousal M (SD) 2.45 (0.38) 4.55 (0.44) 6.3 (0.42) 6.32 (0.51) 
 
The fixation cross, cue and target were all displayed in black ink and bold on grey 
background. The fixation cross was presented at the center of the screen in font size 32 pt. 
The target (a single dot) and the cue (the “§”-symbol) appeared 8.64 cm to the left or right of 
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the fixation cross in font size 55 pt. 
2.2.1.3. Procedure 
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by an 
IAPS picture for 350 ms. After another short fixation period (200 ms) the cue was presented 
left or right of the fixation cross for 200 ms. The target appeared after a variable inter stimulus 
interval of 50 or 150 ms, which was included to reduce premature responses to the cue, and 
remained on the screen until the participant pressed the spatially congruent response key. 
Participants were instructed to react as fast as possible while avoiding errors. In case of an 
error, the German word for error (“Fehler”) was presented for 1000 ms as feedback. An 
example trial is depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Design and procedure of a validly cued trial of the spatial response cueing task in 
Experiment 1. 
 
To assure that all participants started with a similar mood, all participants passed a five 
minute relaxation exercise – comprised of relaxing music and spoken instructions for muscle 
relaxation – prior to the actual experiment. These instructions were standardized mp3-files 
presented via stereo headphones. Subsequently, 12 practice trials without IAPS pictures 
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enabled the participants to get used to the cueing task. These practice trials were followed by 
two experimental blocks, in which an IAPS picture preceded every trial. Both blocks 
consisted of 120 trials (80 valid and 40 invalid), separated by a short break. The trial 
procedure within each block was pseudo-random: Each block consisted of 10 sequences of 12 
trials and within these 12 trials the only constraint was that cues and targets appeared equally 
often on the left and the right side. Affective pictures were drawn from the set of the picture 
pool at random without replacement until all pictures had been presented once and then the 
procedure started all over again. 
2.2.1.4. Design 
A 4 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh vs. negativehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: 
valid vs. invalid) mixed factors design was used. Affect was manipulated between, and Cue 
validity varied within participants. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as 
dependent measures. 
 
2.2.2. Results 
2.2.2.1. Data analysis 
The practice trials as well as the first trial of each experimental block were excluded 
from analyses. In addition, error trials, trials following an error, and trials with RTs below 
150 ms or above 1500 ms were excluded (4.18 % of the data). Furthermore, RTs differing 
more than three standard deviations from individual means were considered as outliers and 
also removed prior analysis (1.15 % of the trials). The data of two participants were excluded 
from further analyses, because of too many errors (individual mean error rates 11 % and 14 % 
while overall error rate was 2.37 %). Another two subjects had to be excluded due to 
untypical RTs throughout the experiment. One was exceptionally slow (M = 492 ms) in 
comparison to mean RTs of his affect group (M positivelow = 344 ms), and the other 
participant got continuously slower throughout the experiment and also had high mean RTs 
(M = 411 ms, while M neutral = 349 ms). Of the remaining data, mean RTs and error rates of 
each design cell (see Table 2.2) were entered into a 4 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh vs. negativehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Afterwards, separate analyses were conducted to isolate valence and 
arousal effects, respectively. 
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2.2.2.1.Error data, overall analysis 
The overall ANOVA for the error data brought up a main effect of Cue validity, 
F(1, 79) = 102.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .564. Fewer errors were made in valid than invalid trials 
(0.17 % vs. 4.08 %). The main effect of Affect (F = 1.98, p = .123) as well as the interaction 
of Affect x Cue (F = 2.35, p = .079) did not prove reliable. The overall error rate was 2.37 % 
(SD = 2.36). 
 
Table 2.2. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 1 
(SD in parentheses) as a function of Affect group and Cue validity. 
 Affect group 
 neutral positivelow positivehigh negativehigh 
 valid invalid valid invalid valid invalid valid invalid 
RT 
(SD) 
332 
(21.4) 
367 
(35.5) 
332 
(33.3) 
357 
(40.69) 
320 
(26.0) 
363 
(43.9) 
349 
(40.7) 
394 
(49.66) 
Errors 
(SD) 
0.24 
(0.38) 
4.11 
(3.1) 
0.19 
(0.3) 
3.05 
(3.16) 
0.09 
(0.23) 
5.64 
(3.95) 
0.15 
(0.28) 
3.54 
(3.8) 
 
2.2.2.2. RT data, overall analysis 
Significant main effects of Affect, F(3, 79) = 3.33, p < .05, ηp2 = .112, and Cue 
validity, F(1, 79) = 123.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, were found. Planned comparisons showed that 
the negativehigh group (372 ms) responded slower than the neutral (349 ms, F(1, 79) = 4.1, 
p < .05) as well as the positivelow (342 ms, F(1, 79) = 6.62, p < .05) and the positivehigh group 
(344 ms, F(1, 79) = 8.21, p < .01). No significant differences were found between neutral and 
both positive groups as well as between the two positive groups (all F < 0.55, all p > .459). 
Participants responded significantly faster after valid than after invalid trials (333 ms vs. 
370 ms), resulting in an overall CVE of 37 ms. The interaction of Affect x Cue validity did 
not prove reliable (F = 1.88, p = .139).  
The overall analysis of mean RTs and error rates did not reveal a significant 
interaction of Affect x Cue validity. However, descriptively the positivelow group, as expected, 
showed the smallest CVE in both RTs and error rates (see Figure 2.2). Because the neutral 
group was more of a descriptive baseline – it differed on both valence and arousal levels from 
all other affect groups – additional analyses without the neutral group were conducted to 
search more directly for valence and arousal effects on cognitive control. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean cue validity effects (CVE) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 1 as a 
function of Affect group. The left panel (A) represents CVE differences in error rates (in %), the right panel (B) 
represents CVE differences in RTs (in ms). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
2.2.2.3. Arousal effect, positivelow vs. positivehigh 
Mean error rates were entered into a 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue 
validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors ANOVA. Significant main effects of Arousal, 
F(1, 41) = 5.01, p < .05, ηp2  = 109, and Cue validity, F(1, 41) = 60.34, ηp2 = .595, were found, 
which were further qualified by a significant interaction of Arousal and Cue validity, F(1, 41) 
= 6.12, p < .05, ηp2 = .13. CVE was smaller in the positivelow group, while especially less 
errors were made in invalid trials (3.05 % vs. 5.64 %). The same analysis for mean RTs 
revealed a significant main effect of Cue validity, F(1, 41) = 54.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .569. 
Participants responded faster after valid trials (326 ms vs. 360 ms), resulting in a CVE of 
34 ms. The interaction of Arousal x Cue validity, F(1, 41) = 3.74, p = .059, ηp2= .084, was on 
the threshold of significance. Therefore, the JZS-Bayes factor (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009) was additionally calculated, which gives information about the 
probability of a hypothesis conditionally on observed data. JZS-Bayes factor was 0.895, 
which means that there is indeed some evidence in favor of a difference in CVEs between 
positivelow and positivehigh group. The main effect of Arousal did not prove reliable (F < 1, 
p = .787). 
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2.2.2.4. Valence effect, positivehigh vs. negativehigh  
Another 2 (Valence: positivehigh vs. negativehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) 
mixed factors ANOVA for mean error rates revealed a significant main effect of Cue validity, 
F(1, 41) = 54.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .573, with less errors in validly cued trials (0.12 % vs. 
4.59 %). The main effect of Valence (F = 3.04, p = .089) and the interaction of Valence x Cue 
validity (F = 3.23, p = .08) did not prove reliable. The same analysis for mean RTs revealed 
significant main effects of Valence, F(1, 41) = 7.02, p < .05, ηp2 = .146, and Cue validity, 
F(1, 41) = 71.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .637, with slower RTs in the negative group (372 ms vs. 
342 ms) and faster RTs following valid trials (334 ms vs. 379 ms). The interaction of Valence 
and Cue validity did not prove reliable (F < 1, p = .822). 
 
2.2.3. Discussion 
As expected, the results of Experiment 1 showed a reliable CVE with faster RTs and 
fewer errors on valid trials in all affect groups. More importantly, with respect to the topic of 
the present thesis, Experiment 1 resulted in preliminary evidence for enhanced cognitive 
flexibility specifically under positive affect with low arousal. The positivelow group 
descriptively had the smallest CVE, both in error rates and RTs. When directly comparing 
positive affect with low and high arousal, this effect was significant in the error data and just 
at the threshold of significance in the RT data. Furthermore, Experiment 1 revealed a general 
slowdown of RTs in the negativehigh group. A direct comparison between negativehigh and 
positivehigh group showed that this effect is not attributable to high arousal, because 
participants under highly arousing positive affect were significantly faster as was also the case 
in the study by Demanet et al. (2011). Comparable to previous studies including a low arousal 
negative control group (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), negative affect with 
high arousal, however, did not influence cognitive flexibility. This suggests that only positive 
affect modulates cognitive control processes, while highly arousing negative stimuli cause a 
valence specific general interference effect. 
In sum, Experiment 1 already indicates that arousal influences should not be neglected 
when investigating positive affect effects, and that only positive affect in combination with 
low arousal increases cognitive flexibility. However, the statistical effects in this first 
experiment were rather subtle. Therefore, Experiment 2 was run to collect more empirical 
support for the modulation of the CVE by positive affect with differing arousal levels. 
CHAPTER 2 – EXPERIMENT 2  48 
 
2.3.  Experiment 2: Spatial response cueing under increased 
working memory load 
A very simple response cueing task was used in Experiment 1, which resulted in very 
fast overall RTs (M = 333 ms) and a low overall error rate (2.37 %). Therefore, marginally 
significant differences between groups might be due to a floor effect. To increase variance 
and thereby provide room for affective modulations, task difficulty was increased in 
Experiment 2. To assure that both experiments were still comparable the same cueing task 
with informative cues (66 % cue validity) was used, but this time in combination with a 
concurrent math task.  
Experiment 1 showed general task interference in the negativehigh group, but no 
additional influence on cognitive flexibility. Based on this result and due to the focus on 
positive affect in the present thesis the negative control group was dropped for Experiment 2. 
Following the results of Experiment 1 the CVE was assumed to be reduced in the positivelow 
group, but increased in the positivehigh group, compared to the neutral group. 
 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
Another 60 students of Regensburg University participated in the experiment for 
course credit or 5 Euro. Fifty-five subjects (see Results for exclusion criteria) were included 
into the final data analysis (Mean age = 22.86 years, SD = 3.79, range = 19-45, 40 female). 
Participants were assigned randomly to the three affect groups (18 neutral, 19 positivelow, 
18 positivehigh). All participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session. 
2.3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the numbers 
presented in the math task. The numbers 1 to 5 were presented centrally, in black ink and in 
size 32 pt. Responses in the math task had to be typed in with the number keys of the first row 
of the keyboard. 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
Procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1 with the following 
exceptions: First, in each trial of the cueing task the first fixation was replaced by a random 
number from 1 to 5 for 800 ms. These numbers were part of the additional math task. 
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Participants performed the cueing task, and at the same time had to add up the random 
numbers. Every 12 trials subjects were asked to type in the result of the summation task, 
which was followed by an informative feedback (3500 ms). Second, the actual experiment 
was preceded by a math test to assure that the affect groups did not differ according to their 
calculating skills. To this end, a subtest of the Leistungsprüfsystem (L-P-S, Horn 1983) was 
used, which requires adding up lines of 10 random numbers from 2 to 9 under speeded 
conditions and is therefore similar to the actual experimental situation. And third, because of 
the increased task difficulty additional practice blocks were added. The first block comprised 
12 trials of the spatial response cueing task. The next practice block (24 trials) introduced the 
math task in addition to the response cueing task. It included two complete math task cycles 
of 12 trials with feedback. In a final practice block (12 trials) an IAPS picture preceded every 
cueing trial. Data acquisition took part in the following 3 experimental blocks with 120 trials 
each (80 valid and 40 invalid trials, 10 math task cycles per block).  
2.3.1.4. Design 
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) 
mixed factors design was used. Affect was manipulated between, whereas Cue validity varied 
within participants. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as dependent measures. 
 
2.3.2. Results 
2.3.2.1. Data analysis 
Possible group differences in calculating skills were checked before the experiment 
and during the experiment with an ANOVA on performance in the L-P-S subtest as well as in 
the additional math task. For analysis of error rates and RTs in the cueing task, trials with 
math task responses differing more than 2 from the correct result were excluded from analysis 
(6.31 % of the data)1
                                                     
1 To assure that participants were truly engaged with both the response cueing task and the additional 
math task, cueing task performance was controlled for performance in the math task. A rather moderate criterion 
(correct response +/- 2) was chosen to minimize data loss, because exclusion due to math task performance 
meant to exclude a complete cycle of 12 cueing trials. With an absolute criterion (only correct responses 
included) 17.7 % of all trials would have been excluded. The moderate criterion aimed to include all trials where 
participants genuinely tried to follow instructions.  
. Further preprocessing was the same as in Experiment 1, which resulted 
in the exclusion of another 6.83 % of the trials. Furthermore one participant of the neutral 
group was excluded because he did not follow the instructions. Also two subjects of the 
positivelow group had to be excluded. The first made too many errors in the math task (76.7 %, 
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while mean error rate was 14.7 %), and the second made too many errors in the cueing task 
(14.8 %, while mean error rate was 1.3 %). Finally, two participants of the positivehigh group 
were excluded from further analysis, because they were exceptionally slow (715 ms and 894 
ms, while mean RTs were 448 ms). Of the remaining data, mean RTs and error rates of each 
design cell (see Table 2.3) were entered into a 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh) 
x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors ANOVA. 
 
Table 2.3. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 2 
(SD in parenthesis) as a function of Affect group and Cue validity. 
  Affect group 
  neutral positivelow positivehigh 
  valid invalid valid invalid valid invalid 
RT (SD) 405 (77.6) 477 (105.8) 445 (111.9) 487 (111.2) 401 (60.3) 471 (90.7) 
Errors (SD) 0.21 (0.33) 3.32 (3.61) 0.09 (0.18) 1.86 (2.38) 0.0 (0.0) 2.35 (2.84) 
 
2.3.2.2. Math performance 
There were no performance differences in the L-P-S subtest between affect groups 
before the experiment, F(2, 52) = 2.62, p = .082, ηp2 = .092. Also, no significant differences 
between the three affect groups were found in the additional math task during the experiment 
(F < 1, p = .395). 
2.3.2.3. Error data, overall analysis 
The overall error rate was 1.3 % (SD = 1.5), and individual mean error rates were 
below 7.5 % for all subjects. The overall ANOVA for the error data brought up a main effect 
of Cue validity, F(1, 52) = 36.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .413, with fewer errors in valid than in 
invalid trials (0.10 % vs. 2.51 %). The main effect Affect as well as the interaction of Affect x 
Cue validity did not prove reliable (Fs < 1.37, ps > .263). 
2.3.2.4. RT data, overall analysis 
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Cue validity, F(1, 52) = 142.39, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .732. Participants responded significantly faster after valid than after invalid 
trials (418 ms vs. 478 ms), resulting in an overall CVE of 60 ms. More importantly, a 
significant interaction of Affect x Cue validity was found, F(2, 52) = 3.51, p < .05, ηp2 = .119, 
which is depicted in Figure 2.3. Planned comparisons showed a reduced CVE in the 
positivelow group (41 ms) as compared to the neutral group (72 ms; F = 5.49, p < .05) and the 
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positivehigh group (70 ms; F = 4.94, p < .05). There was no significant difference between 
neutral and positivehigh group (F < 1, p = .904). Also, the main effect of Affect was not 
significant (F < 1, p = .578). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean Cue validity effects (in ms) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 2 as a 
function of Affect group. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
2.3.3. Discussion 
The slowdown of mean RTs from Experiment 1 to 2 (333 ms vs. 437 ms) indicates 
that the intended increase in task difficulty was successful. The paradigm adaptations resulted 
in clear-cut evidence of a reduced CVE in the positivelow group compared to the neutral and 
the positivehigh group. This suggests that only positive affect in combination with low arousal, 
but not positive affect in combination with high arousal, increases cognitive flexibility. 
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2.4. Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2 
Taken together, Experiment 1 and 2 confirm previous results of increased cognitive 
flexibility under positive affect (e.g., Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach 
& Goschke, 2004;Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999; van Wouwe et al., 2011), and, 
furthermore, add a new finding: Positive affect effects on cognitive control are not 
independent from arousal. Only positive affect in combination with low arousal reduced the 
CVE. This strengthens the assumptions that both valence and arousal are important 
components of affect (Russell, 1980; Russell, 2003), and that arousal – mediated via NE 
activity – has an additional modulatory influence on cognitive control (cf., Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005a; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005b). Furthermore, Experiment 1 revealed a 
valence specific general task interference effect for negative, highly arousing pictures. 
The reduced CVE in the positivelow group indicates that participants under low 
arousing positive affect were better able to adapt to a violation of expectations. According to 
the neuropsychological theory of positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) this 
enhancement in flexibility is assumed to be mediated by DA activity. Interestingly, no 
reduction in CVE was found for positive affect with high arousal. It might be that NE activity, 
which is associated with arousal (cf., Grant et al., 1988), counteracts this DA mediated 
positive affect effect. Part II of the present thesis will gather more evidence for this arousal 
dependent positive affect effect. Therefore, a more detailed discussion will be given later on 
in the General Discussion section (see Chapter 5). 
The valence effect between the negativehigh and positivehigh group of Experiment 1 
replicates previous results by Demanet et al. (2011), who also found a slowdown of RTs after 
negative highly arousing pictures as compared to positive highly arousing pictures in a within-
participants design. Also Pereira and colleagues (Pereira et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2006) 
found a valence specific task interference effect by negative pictures in a simple target 
detection task. In one study (2006) they directly investigated differences between a blocked 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or a random (Experiment 3) – mixed with positive and neutral 
pictures – presentation of negative pictures, and found evidence for both a sustained (blocked 
presentation) and a transient (random presentation) interference effect. Moreover, Kleinsorge 
(2007; 2009) showed that this negative affect effect is modulated by anticipation: 
Paradoxically, interference by negative pictures in an arithmetic verification task increased, 
when a cue indicated the valence of the upcoming picture in advance. There are several 
concurring theories for explaining this robust interference effect: For example, Pessoa (2009) 
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assumes that negative stimuli are prioritized in perception as well as processing due to their 
high threat level. Because of the overlap between affective and cognitive control systems (cf., 
Chapter 1.3.) he suggests, furthermore, that threatening stimuli lead to task interference by 
diverting limited processing resources. Pereira et al. (2006; 2010) agree with the assumption 
that negative stimuli are a special category. They suggest, however, that the high threat level 
influences behavior through motivational systems: Negative stimuli are assumed to activate 
the defense system. More precisely, highly arousing negative pictures have been shown to 
elicit a freezing-like state (Azevedo et al., 2005), which is supposed to underlie the slowdown 
of RTs. The present results might also fit with the attentional control theory (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), 
which makes predictions about the cognitive effects of anxiety. Worrisome thoughts, which 
are associated with anxiety, are supposed to interfere with cognitive control by using up task-
relevant resources. The attentional control theory, furthermore, assumes that this resource 
competition particularly worsens processing efficiency: By increasing effort, compensatory 
mechanisms are able to maintain performance effectiveness, which results in a constant 
accuracy performance but accompanied by a slowdown in RTs. That is exactly the response 
pattern found in the negativehigh group of Experiment 1. Anxiety is associated with threatening 
situations, and threat is characteristic for highly arousing negative stimuli. Furthermore, 
repeated presentation of negative affective pictures has been shown to induce a sustained 
negative mood state (Bradley et al., 1996). Thus, it might be that the affect induction 
procedure of Experiment 1 resulted in an anxiety-like mood state with the associated 
cognitive consequences. For completion, it should also be noted that some researchers (e.g., 
De Houwer & Tibboel, 2010; Schimmack, 2005) suggest an arousal based interference effect 
of task-irrelevant affective stimuli: In accordance with Scherer’s sequential evaluation check 
model (2001) an affective stimulus is assumed to be first of all appraised according to its 
arousal level, which then determines its relevance and the amount of processing the stimulus 
gets. Following again a resource competition framework, this appraisal is supposed to 
consume processing capacity, which is then missing for the primary cognitive task and thus 
impairs performance. This theory would, therefore, predict that both positive and negative 
highly arousing stimuli cause general task interference, which is at odds with the present 
results and several findings of other empirical studies (e.g., Demanet et al., 2011; Kleinsorge, 
2007; Kleinsorge, 2009; Pereira et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2006). Concerning the remaining 
alternative explanations, results of Experiment 1 allow no decision on the true mechanism 
behind this valence specific interference effect. However, with respect to the scope of the 
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present thesis, it is more important that negative affect in combination with high arousal only 
impaired performance in general, and had no specific modulatory effect on cognitive control.  
 
2.5. Interim Summary 
Part I of the present thesis succeeded in gathering further insight into the affective 
modulation of cognitive control. Considering both valence and arousal influences revealed 
specific positive affect effects: As indicated by a reduced CVE, specifically positive affect 
with low arousal seems to increase cognitive flexibility, while high arousal appears to 
counteract this positive affect effect. Negative affect with high arousal caused a valence 
specific general task interference effect with slower RTs than all other affect groups, while no 
further modulation of the CVE by negative affect was found. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Part II: How positive affect modulates cognitive control: proactive 
vs. reactive control 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Part I of the present thesis showed that positive affect in combination with low or high 
arousal differentially influences the CVE. Only low arousing positive affect reduced the CVE, 
which was interpreted as a sign of increased cognitive flexibility in form of an enhanced 
ability to overcome pre-dominant response tendencies. A problem for this interpretation is, 
however, that two different mechanisms are feasible for explaining a reduced CVE in the 
simple response cueing paradigm of Experiments 1 and 2: On the one hand, participants in the 
positivelow group might have indeed been better able to overcome the pre-activated, but 
incorrect response tendency in an invalid trial. That is, there might have been a performance 
benefit specifically in unexpected, invalid trials as compared to the other affect groups. On the 
other hand, a reduced CVE could have been a consequence of a reduced reliance on the 
informative cues. Normally informative cues are used to optimize performance, which results 
in benefits in the more frequent valid trials and costs in the less frequent invalid trials 
(= CVE). A correct response in the cueing task of Experiments 1 and 2 is, however, also 
possible without using the cue for response preparation, because the target alone has sufficient 
information for a correct response. Thus, performance of participants in the positivelow group 
as compared to the other affect groups might have been less dependent on the cues resulting 
in costs in valid trials and benefits in invalid trials (= reduced CVE). So far, however, based 
on the cueing paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2 only, it cannot be decided, which 
mechanism drove the reduced CVE, because no neutral cue condition was included.  
 Interestingly, the oppositional explanations described above correspond to the 
differential control modes of the DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007): An 
enhanced ability to overcome pre-dominant response tendencies would mean increased 
reactive control (i.e., control processes after target onset). Less reliance on informative cues, 
however, would mean reduced proactive control (i.e., preparatory control processes before 
target onset). Moreover, affect is one of the factors that are assumed to moderate, which 
control strategy is favored in a given situation. Therefore, it would be interesting to know not 
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only, whether positive affect influences cognitive control in general, but more precisely, 
whether positive affect modulates proactive or reactive control. 
In contrast to the response cueing paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2, the AX-CPT 
paradigm theoretically allows a differentiation between both control strategies: Increased 
reactive control should specifically improve AY performance, where a cue-induced response 
bias has to be overcome. Reduced proactive control should cause a benefit in AY trials, too, 
but additionally costs in BX and BY trials, because performance is in general less dependent 
on the cue information. Two studies (Dreisbach, 2006; van Wouwe et al., 2011) already 
investigated how positive affect influences performance in the AX-CPT: The Dreisbach study 
– manipulating affect via IAPS pictures preceding every trial – found evidence for less cue 
usage (benefit in AY trials, costs in BX and BY trials) under positive affect, which indicates a 
reduction of proactive control. Van Wouwe et al. – manipulating affect via emotional film 
clips before the actual experiment – found, in line with the Dreisbach study, improved 
performance in AY trials, but no impairment in BX and BY trials, which indicates an increase 
in reactive control. Thus, it still remains an open question, whether positive affect modulates 
proactive or reactive control. Therefore, the main aim of Part II of the present thesis is to 
further investigate this interesting research question. Additionally, further evidence will be 
gathered on the differential influences on cognitive control of positive affect in combination 
with low or high arousal levels. 
 
 
3.2. Experiment 3: Spatial response cueing with non-informative 
cues 
Based on Experiments 1 and 2, it cannot be decided, whether positive affect with low 
arousal modulated proactive or reactive control, because the reduced CVE found in the 
positivelow group can be explained by either increased reactive control or reduced proactive 
control. To investigate, which kind of control was influenced by positive affect, Experiment 3 
was conducted with a modified cueing paradigm: Uninformative cues were used, so that 
participants could not optimize their performance with a proactive control strategy (cf., 
Braver et al., 2007). Further modifications (see Methods section below) were taken to 
strengthen bottom-up, automatic cueing effects. In this way, there should again be a strong 
response bias toward cue-congruent reactions, which has to be overcome by reactive control 
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in invalidly cued trials. 
If the specific reduction in CVE under positive affect with low arousal can be 
replicated in the following experiment with a paradigm that amplifies automatic response 
activation, this would speak in favor of a modulation of reactive control. Conversely, any 
difference in results between the Experiments of Part I and Experiment 3 can be interpreted in 
favor of a modulation of proactive control in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
3.2.1. Method 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Another 59 students of Regensburg University participated in Experiment 3 (Mean age 
= 22.02 years, SD = 3.55, range = 19-35, 55 female) were again assigned randomly to the 
same three affect groups as in Experiment 2 (20 neutral, 20 positivelow, 19 positivehigh). All 
participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session. 
3.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli equaled those of Experiment 1 except for the following 
changes: The fixation cross as well as the two possible target locations were always enclosed 
by black bordered boxes (size 100 x 100 pixels). As a cue the border of one peripheral box 
changed border width from 1 to 5 pt. Figure 3.1 illustrates the design and procedure of an 
example trial of Experiment 3. 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with the following three changes: 
First, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target was changed to 50 or 
150 ms. So, the SOA was shorter than in Experiment 1 but equaled the inter stimulus interval 
of Experiment 1. Second, the cue remained on screen with the target until the participant 
pressed a response key. And third, the cue validity percentage was reduced to 50 %, which 
resulted in 60 valid and 60 invalid trials per block. All these variations should boost bottom-
up cueing effects and reduce top-down involvement, which was made to induce a bias in 
favor of a reactive control strategy. Note that both SOAs lie within the range where CVEs due 
to early facilitation can usually be found (e.g., Maruff, Yucel, Danckert, Stuart, & Currie, 
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19992
 
). 
 
Figure 3.1. Design and procedure of a validly cued trial of the spatial response cueing task in 
Experiment 3. 
 
3.2.1.4. Design 
Again a 3 (Affect: negative vs. neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: 
valid vs. invalid) mixed factor design was used. Affect was manipulated between, and Cue 
validity varied within participants. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as 
dependent measures. 
 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Data analysis 
Data preprocessing was the same as in Experiment 1 and resulted in exclusion of 
2.73 % of the data. Additional 1.24 % of the trials were excluded by trimming individual RTs 
with a cutoff at three standard deviations. Of the remaining data, mean RTs and error rates of 
                                                     
2 This reference investigated effects of different SOAs in an attentional cueing paradigm. Wilson & 
Pratt (2007) could, however, show that attentional cueing also induces a bias in response selection. Therefore, 
the same SOA thresholds were used in the present response cueing paradigm. 
CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 3  59 
 
each design cell (see Table 3.1) were entered into a 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors ANOVA. 
 
Table 3.1. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 3 
(SD in parenthesis) as a function of Affect group and Cue validity. 
  Affect group 
  neutral positivelow positivehigh 
  valid invalid valid invalid valid invalid 
RT (SD) 326 (30.3) 366 (39.2) 312 (36.8) 355 (36.1) 320 (33.0) 355 (35.5) 
Errors (SD) 0.17 (0.35) 1.72 (1.81) 0.13 (.31) 2.65 (2.55) 0.22 (0.47) 2.26 (2.38) 
 
3.2.2.2. Error data 
As expected, the ANOVA for the error data revealed a main effect of Cue validity, 
F(1, 65) = 49.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .471. Participants made fewer errors in valid than invalid 
trials (0.17 % vs. 2.21 %). No further significant effects were found (all F < 1, all p > .39). 
The overall error rate was 1.11 % (SD = 1.17), while individual mean error rates were below 
7 % for all subjects.  
3.2.2.3. RT data 
The overall ANOVA for the RT data also revealed a significant main effect of Cue 
validity, F(1, 56) = 474.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .894. Participant responded faster in validly cued 
trials (319 ms vs. 359 ms), resulting in an overall CVE of 40 ms. The main effect of Affect 
and the interaction of Affect x Cue validity did not prove reliable (all F < 1.13, all p > .33). 
There were no significant differences in CVE between the three affect groups (neutral 
= 40 ms, positivelow = 43 ms, and positivehigh = 35 ms; see Figure 3.2). However, a non 
significant result in conventional significance testing does not allow a confirmation of 
invariances (cf., Rouder et al., 2009).  Therefore, JZS-Bayes factors for CVE comparisons 
between the affect groups were additionally calculated to be able to state evidence for the null 
hypothesis. JZS-Bayes factors in Experiment 3 ranged from 1.66 to 3.75, that is, the null 
hypothesis – no affective difference in CVE – was indeed more likely. 
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Figure 3.2. Mean Cue validity effects (in ms) in the spatial response cueing task of Experiment 3 as a 
function of Affect group. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
Results of Experiment 3 are clear-cut. Positive affect – irrespective of valence level – 
had no influence on task performance. Since the CVE was again highly significant and 
present in all affect conditions, reactive control was still involved in order to overcome the 
wrongly activated response tendency. However, because of the more bottom-up cueing 
paradigm with non-informative cues, the involvement of proactive control, if at all, should 
have been minimized in Experiment 3 (cf., Braver et al., 2007). It can thus be concluded that 
the reduced CVE in the positivelow group found in Experiments 1 and 2 was caused by a 
reduced reliance on informative cues.  
So, in sum the results of the response cueing experiments (Experiments 1 to 3) speak 
in favor of an affective modulation of proactive control only, which was reduced specifically 
under positive affect with low arousal. However, it would be even better proof, if this specific 
affect effect – modulation of proactive and not reactive control – could be shown in a unique 
experiment. Therefore, Experiment 4 was conducted.  
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3.3. Experiment 4: Task switching with informative task cues 
The main aim of Experiment 4 was to gather more direct evidence that specifically 
proactive control and not reactive control is influenced by positive affect. Furthermore, it was 
aimed to test, whether the affective modulation of proactive control can also be found for task 
cues instead of response cues (as was the case with the response cueing paradigm used here 
and the AX-CPT in previous studies). A task switching paradigm was employed to address 
these issues. Task switching (for recent reviews, see e.g. Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, 
Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010) with univalent stimuli (e.g., digits and letters) is well suited 
to investigate reactive control in form of differences in switch costs. Using univalent stimuli 
(i.e., a given stimulus is only associated with one of the two possible tasks) and no pre-cues, 
variations in switch costs can be taken as a direct indicator for reactive control processes. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that participants are generally very sensitive to probability 
cues (i.e., informative, but not 100 % valid) in task switching (Dreisbach & Haider, 2006; 
Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Hübner, Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez, & Peters, 2004; 
Miniussi, Marzi, & Nobre, 2005; Wendt, Luna-Rodriguez, Reisenauer, Jacobsen, & 
Dreisbach, 2012). Therefore, a cued task switching paradigm with valid and invalid cues does 
not only allow the investigation of reactive control (in form of differences in switch costs) but 
also proactive control (in form of differences in the CVE like in Experiments 1 and 2).  
Thus, in Experiment 4 a task switching paradigm with a digit and a letter task was 
used that started without task cues. After the first experimental block without cues, 
informative task cues with a cue validity of 75 % preceded each trial. If positive affect with 
low arousal reduces proactive control – as Experiments 1 to 3 suggest – the CVE should again 
be reduced in the positivelow group. If positive affect, however, increases reactive control, 
there should be a reduction of switch costs in the positivelow group – especially so in the block 
without pre-cues. 
 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students from the Regensburg University (age M = 22.53 years, 
SD = 4.02, range = 18 – 36, 53 female) participated in the experiment for course credit or 
5 Euro. Participants were assigned randomly to the three affect groups (20 positivelow, 20 
positivehigh, 20 neutral). All participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the 
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session. Because a possible modulation of switch costs was of special theoretical interest, 
participants with negative switch costs were excluded and replaced (2 in the neutral, 3 in the 
positivelow, and 2 in the positivehigh group). 
3.3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and IAPS picture sets (neutral, positivelow, and positivehigh) were the same 
as in Experiments 1 to 3. 
Eight digits (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9) written in green and eight letters (A, E, O, U, C, 
K, G, and T) written in purple served as target stimuli and were presented at the center of the 
screen in font size 52. The color coding of the digit and letter task was counterbalanced across 
participants. Odd numbers and vowels were always assigned to one response key, even 
numbers and consonants to the other, while response mapping to the left and right response 
key (y- and m-key on a QWERTZ keyboard) was also counterbalanced between participants. 
In experimental blocks 2 to 4, a color coded fixation cross (purple or green) served as 
informative task cue. 
3.3.1.3. Procedure 
The experiment comprised one task switching block without task cues followed by 
three blocks including informative task cues. In the first block each trial started with an IAPS 
picture (350 ms) followed by a blank screen (150 ms) and a black fixation cross (1000 ms). 
Then the target stimulus appeared and remained on screen until the participant responded. 
Subjects had to decide whether a number was odd or even (digit task) or whether a letter was 
a vowel or consonant (letter task). Participants were instructed to react as fast as possible 
while avoiding errors. Feedback was given for errors only (2000 ms), each trial ended with an 
intertrial interval of 500 ms. Procedure in the following blocks with informative task cues was 
the same as in the first block except that the fixation cross was now color coded and served as 
a task cue for the following task. In valid trials (75 % of all trials) the colored fixation cross 
was followed by a target stimulus in the same color, thereby enabling the preparation of the 
upcoming task in a proactive manner. In contrast, in invalid trials (25 % of all trials) the 
fixation color incorrectly predicted the upcoming target color, and can therefore mislead to 
prepare the wrong task. An example trial is visualized in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. Design and procedure of a letter task trial in experimental block 1 (= task switching without 
informative precues) of Experiment 4. 
 
The experiment started with the same relaxation exercise that was also used in the 
previous experiments. Subsequently, 16 practice trials (random presentation of all target 
stimuli) without IAPS pictures enabled the participants to get used to the task switching 
procedure. This practice block was followed by 64 trials with an IAPS picture preceding 
every trial. Data acquisition took place in the following four experimental blocks – the first 
without informative task cues – with 128 trials each. Each block contained 64 digit tasks (4 x 
8 numbers) and 64 letter tasks (4 x 8 letters). Stimulus presentation was pseudo-randomized 
with the following constraints: Repeat and switch trials were evenly distributed. Immediate 
repetitions of target stimuli or IAPS pictures were not allowed. Task cues (96 valid, 32 
invalid) were counterbalanced across all trial types. 
3.3.1.4. Design 
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch) 
design with Affect as between and Trial type as within factor was used in the first block 
without task cues. The experimental blocks including informative task cues had a 3 (Affect) x 
3 (Block: 2 vs. 3 vs. 4) x 2 (Trial type) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) repeated measures 
design. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as dependent measures. 
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3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Data analysis 
Practice trials as well as the first trial of each experimental block were excluded from 
analyses. In addition, error trials, trials following an error, and trials with RTs differing more 
than three standard deviations from individual means were also removed prior analysis 
(9.34 % of all trials). Separate analyses were conducted for task switching performance (mean 
error rates and RTs) in the first experimental block without task cues, and for performance in 
experimental blocks 2 to 4 with informative task cues. 
3.3.2.2. Task switching performance, Block 1 without task cues 
Mean RTs (see Table 3.2) were entered into a 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh) x 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch) mixed factors ANOVA. A significant main 
effect of Trial type, F(1, 57) = 106.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .651, with faster responses in repeat 
trials (655 ms vs. 733 ms) was found. The main effect of Affect as well as the interaction of 
Affect x Trial type did not prove reliable (all F < 1.97, all p > .150). The same analysis for 
mean error rates (see Table 3.2) also resulted in a significant main effect of Trial type, 
F(1, 57) = 26.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .319, with less errors in repeat trials (2.28 % vs. 5.97 %). 
Again, no significant affect effects were found (all F < 1.19, all p > .31). JZS-Bayes factors 
for differences in switch costs between the affect groups ranged from 2.95 to 4.04, which 
means that it is more likely that there are indeed equal switch costs in all three groups (see 
Figure 3.3).  
 
Table 3.2. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the in the first experimental block of Experiment 
4 (task switching without task cues) as a function of Affect group and Trial type. 
 
Affect group 
 neutral positivelow positivehigh 
 repeat switch repeat switch repeat switch 
RT (SD) 646 (76.9) 731 (116.7) 705 (170.5) 774 (202.0) 615 (96.9) 693 (133.5) 
Errors (SD) 2.7 (2.89) 5.89 (4.68) 1.52 (2.09) 4.83 (3.72) 2.64 (2.73) 7.18 (8.19) 
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Figure 3.3. Mean switch costs (in ms) in the task switching block without pre-cues of Experiment 4 as a 
function of Affect group. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3.2.3. Task switching performance, Blocks 2 to 4 with informative 
task cues 
To check the effectiveness of the cues over time, a 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh) x 3 (Block: 2 vs. 3 vs. 4) x 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch) x 2 (Cue validity: 
valid vs. invalid) mixed factors ANOVA was conducted for the three experimental blocks 
with informative task cues (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for mean RTs and error rates). The analysis 
of mean error rates resulted in significant main effects of Block, F(2, 114) = 8.65, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .131, Trial type, F(1, 57) = 37.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .397, and Cue validity, F(1, 57) = 4.40, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .072, as well as an interaction of Trial type x Cue validity, F(1, 57) = 4.19, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .069. Planned comparisons showed significantly more errors in Block 2 
(3.61 %) as compared to Block 3 (2,81 %, F(1, 57) = 7.97, p < .01) and Block 4 (2.42 %, 
F(1, 57) = 14.20, p < .001). Blocks 3 and 4 did not differ significantly (F = 2.01, p = .162). 
Cue validity had no significant influence on error rates in task repetitions (2.09 % vs. 2.12 %, 
F < 1, p = .915), but there was a significant negative CVE in task switches (F(1,57) = 6.41, 
p < .05) with more errors in valid trials (4.30 % vs. 3.27 %). The interaction of Block and 
Trial type did not prove reliable (F = 2.82, p = .064). There was no significant main effect of 
Affect or significant interactions with Affect (all F < 1.68, all p > .185).  
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Table 3.3. Mean error rates (in %, SD in parentheses) in experimental blocks 2 to 4 of Experiment 4 
(task switching with informative task cues) as a function of Affect group, Trial type, and Cue validity. 
 
Affect group 
 neutral positivelow positivehigh 
Cue repeat switch repeat switch repeat switch 
 Block 2 
valid 2.76 (2.3) 5.55 (4.7) 2.27 (2.0) 4.89 (4.6) 1.87 (2.1) 4.88 (4.0) 
invalid 2.29 (3.7) 5.67 (4.8) 2.5 (4.8) 3.17 (4.6) 2.5 (5.5) 5.01 (5.3) 
 Block3 
valid 2.27 (2.8) 4.62 (5.6) 2.39 (3.4) 4.44 (4.6) 1.67 (2.8) 4.15 (3.9) 
invalid 1.91 (3.2) 2.96 (4.2) 2.15 (3.3) 2.28 (4.0) 2.15 (3.9) 2.73 (5.2) 
 Block 4 
valid 1.7 (2.3) 4.2 (3.8) 2.39 (2.7) 2.8 (2.5) 1.52 (2.0) 3.2 (3.3) 
invalid 2.95 (3.6) 1.96 (3.2) 0.59 (2.6) 2.49 (4.2) 2.06 (4.4) 3.21 (4.9) 
 
Table 3.4 Mean RTs (in ms, SD in parentheses) in experimental blocks 2 to 4 of Experiment 4 (task 
switching with informative task cues) as a function of Affect group, Trial type, and Cue validity. 
 
Affect group 
 neutral positivelow positivehigh 
Cue repeat switch repeat switch repeat switch 
 Block 2 
valid 568 (81.1) 639 (133.9) 588 (61.1) 661 (83.4) 615 (119.9) 702 (142.4) 
invalid 613 (111.9) 626 (92.3) 617 (103.2) 665 (92.9) 702 (176.9) 685 (125.63) 
 Block3 
valid 561 (73.4) 617 (110.2) 590 (91.9) 648 (105.5) 600 (99.8) 665 (141.0) 
invalid 558 (82.7) 643 (151.9) 600 (104.3) 654 (125.5) 603 (123.3) 656 (124.0) 
 Block 4 
valid 557 (86.8) 595 (108.1) 566 (71.4) 608 (140.0) 591 (102.5) 635 (133.8) 
invalid 567 (109.2) 631 (151.1) 579 (81.2) 645 (140.0) 602 (115.6) 631 (126.9) 
 
In the RT analysis significant main effects for Block, F(2, 114) = 19.83, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .258, Trial type, F(1, 57) = 98.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .634, and Cue validity, F(1, 57) = 
19.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .255, were found, which were further qualified by a significant three-
way interaction of these factors, F(2, 114) = 11.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .165. Planned comparisons 
showed a significant interaction of Trial type x Cue validity specifically in the first block with 
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informative task cues, F(1, 57) = 2.54, p < .001 (Blocks 3 and 4: all F < .07, all p > .41). 
Further analysis of Block 2 showed a significant CVE with faster RTs after valid cues in 
repeat trials (590 ms vs. 644 ms, F(1, 57) = 32.28, p < .001), but not in switch trials (667 ms 
vs. 659 ms, F = 1.32, p = .26). So, there was a strong cueing effect only in the first block with 
informative task cues, and specifically in repeat trials. The main effect of Affect as well as all 
other interactions did not prove reliable (all F < 3.36, all p > .067). With respect to the 
hypotheses, also in these blocks with informative task cues the affect groups did not differ 
significantly in switch costs (M neutral = 54 ms, M positivelow = 57 ms, M positivehigh = 
44 ms). JZS- Bayes factors for single comparisons of switch costs ranged from 2.46 to 4.24, 
which further supports that switch costs were indeed comparable in all three groups.  
Regarding the hypothesis of reduced proactive control under positive affect with low 
arousal, a possible affective modulation of the CVE was especially interesting. Therefore, an 
additional analysis was conducted, this time only including Block 2 (i.e., the first block with 
informative task cues), which was the only block where the CVE was significant. 
3.3.2.4. Affect effects, first task switching block with informative task 
cues only 
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch) x 
2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors ANOVA revealed significant main effects for 
Trial type, F(1, 57) = 39.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .409, and Cue validity, F(1, 57 ) = 18.07, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .241. Participants responded faster in repeat trials (617 ms vs. 663 ms) as well 
as in valid trials (629 ms vs. 651 ms). Furthermore, a significant interaction of Trial type x 
Cue validity, F(1, 57) = 22.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .283, was found. Planned comparisons showed 
a significant CVE in repeat trials (590 ms vs. 644 ms, F(1, 57) = 32.28, p < .001), but not in 
switch trials (667 ms vs. 659 ms, F = 1.32, p = .26). Most important with respect to the 
present hypothesis, there was a significant interaction of Affect x Trial type x Cue validity, 
F(2, 57) = 3.08, p = .05, ηp2 = .098, which is depicted in Figure 3.4. CVE was significantly 
smaller in the positivelow compared to the positivehigh group (29 ms vs. 87 ms, F(1, 57) = 6.32, 
p < .05). The CVE in the neutral group (45ms) was descriptively between both positive 
groups but did not differ significantly from either group (Fs < 3.35, ps > .072). The main 
effect Affect and all other interactions did not prove reliable (all F < 1.94, all p > .15). The 
same analysis for mean error rates resulted only in a significant main effect of Trial type, 
F(1, 57) = 25.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .306, with less errors in repeat trials (2.36 % vs. 4.86 %). No 
further significant main effects or interactions were found (all F < 1, all p > .47). 
CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 4  68 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean RTs (in ms) in the first task switching block with informative task cues of 
Experiment 4 as a function of Affect group, Trial type, and Cue validity. Error bars represent 1 standard error of 
the mean. 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 4 switch costs did not differ between affect groups, neither in the first 
experimental block without task cues nor in the following blocks with informative cues. 
Strong cueing effects were found only in the first block with informative task cues and 
specifically in repeat trials. In this block, also an affect effect similar to the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 was found: The CVE in repeat trials was reduced in the positivelow group 
as compared to the positive high group, while the CVE was descriptively in between both 
positive groups in the neutral group. It is not surprising that an affective modulation was only 
found in Block 2, because blockwise analysis of all three blocks including cues showed that 
the informative task cues only had an impact on performance while they were new, whereas 
their influence diminished with more practice in the task (RTs and error rates declined 
throughout the experiment, see Tables 3.2 to 3.4). The generally reduced reliance on cues 
over blocks might be due to the fact that the task cues were neither necessary (because 
univalent stimuli were used) nor entirely useful (e.g., Sudevan & Taylor, 1987). The fact that 
the CVE is restricted to repeat trials only was also found by Miniussi et al. (2005), and might 
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be a consequence of anticipatory backward inhibition (Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 
2003; Li & Dupuis, 2008; Mayr & Keele, 2000): In task switching, backward inhibition refers 
to the phenomenon that preparation for a task switch leads to inhibition of the just executed 
task set, and is hence also a form of proactive control. There is plenty of evidence that the 
foreknowledge about an upcoming task switch suffices to trigger the inhibition of the 
preceding task (Mayr & Keele, 2000, Exp. 5; Hübner et al., 2003; Li & Dupuis, 2008; Wendt 
et al., 2012). Applied to the present data, an invalidly cued repetition may have already caused 
inhibition of the previous task resulting in performance costs when this very task 
unexpectedly repeats. In invalidly cued switches, on the other hand, the cue predicts a 
repetition and as such does not trigger backward inhibition resulting in typical switch costs – 
like in validly cued switches.  
In sum, Experiment 4 succeeded in showing that specifically proactive control and not 
reactive control is modulated by positive affect: Switch costs – as a measure of reactive 
control – were comparable in all three affect groups. Positive affect along with high or low 
arousal did neither improve nor impair the adaption to a (unexpected) task switch. In contrast, 
the CVE – as a measure of proactive control – was again modulated by affect, and indicated a 
reduction of proactive control specifically in the positivelow group. So, together with results 
from Experiments 1 to 3 there is converging evidence that performance under positive affect 
with low arousal is less dependent on informative cues. Positive affect with high arousal, on 
the other hand, may even increase the usage of informative cues. 
 
 
3.4. Experiment 5: Cued global-local task with a within-participants 
affect manipulation 
Experiments 1 to 4 used mixed factorial designs with affect always being manipulated 
between groups. In each group, every experimental trial was preceded by an IAPS picture 
from a specific affective category (negativehigh, neutral, positivelow, or positivehigh). Most 
likely this procedure resulted in both transient and sustained affective reactions: IAPS pictures 
can, on the one hand, elicit typical affective responses very quickly (Codispoti et al., 2001; 
Codispoti et al., 2009), but, on the other hand, are also suited to induce certain mood states via 
repetitive exposure to pictures of the same valence (Bradley et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2005). 
So far, it cannot be decided, whether a sustained affective influence is really necessary for the 
CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 5  70 
 
specific affect effects found in Experiments 1 to 4. The transient affective influence might be 
sufficient on its own. For example, van Steenbergen and colleagues found the same positive 
affect effects on the sequential modulation of response conflicts using either randomized 
affective signals – happy, sad, or neutral smilies – between trials (van Steenbergen, Band, & 
Hommel, 2009) or specific mood induction – inducing calmness, happiness, sadness, and 
anxiety – in a between groups design (van Steenbergen et al., 2010): In both studies positive 
affect was associated with reduced conflict adaptation.  
A successful replication of the specific affect effects found in Experiments 1 to 4 in a 
complete within-participants design would be of both theoretical and practical interest: 
Theoretically, because it would show that not only sustained but also transient affective states 
modulate cognitive control processes. And it would be of practical interest, because future 
experimental designs would need considerably less participants. Thus, the main aim of 
Experiment 5 was to replicate the diverging influences on proactive control by positive affect 
with low or high arousal using a within-participants design with randomized IAPS picture 
presentation. Moreover, the external validity of this specific positive affect effect should be 
tested further. The task switching experiment with informative task cues (Experiment 4) could 
already demonstrate that a reduced CVE under positive affect with low arousal is not 
restricted to simple spatial response cueing paradigms with informative cues (see Experiments 
1 and 2). Therefore, again a new kind of task will be applied in Experiment 5, namely a 
global-local task (cf. Navon, 1977) with informative response cues. 
In this paradigm, global figures consisting of grouped local figures (e.g., several small 
squares forming a large triangle) were used as target stimuli. In each trial participants had to 
detect, whether a prespecified target shape (triangle, diamond, circle, or square) was present 
on the global or local level. An informative cue preceded every trial to indicate, at which level 
the next target would be more likely to occur. Figures with identical shapes both on the global 
and local level (e.g., a large triangle made up of small triangles) were also included, in which 
case subjects could choose freely to respond to either the global or the local level. Including 
these ambiguous target shapes enabled additional measures besides the CVE: In ambiguous 
target trials participants were free to respond to either level, so one interesting new analysis 
was to what extent responses would be in correspondence with the preceding cue (frequency 
analysis). Another new analysis concerned the impact of the two kinds of cues – global vs. 
local – on RTs in a situation, where invalid trials and wrong responses are impossible (RT 
analysis). Furthermore, a final experimental block without cues was added to investigate 
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performance differences between positive affect with high or low arousal, when proactive 
control is not involved. In this block, the analysis of trials with ambiguous targets will be of 
special interest: In general, global processing is preferred over local processing (e.g., Navon, 
1977), a bias which has been shown to be even more pronounced under positive affect 
(Gasper & Clore, 2002). So far, however, it is unknown whether this increased global 
processing preference is further modulated by different arousal levels. 
Naturally, a within-participant affect manipulation results in an increased number of 
trials per participant, because an adequate number of measurements for each factor 
combination is needed to justify the subsequent statistical analyses. To ensure a reasonable 
length of the entire experiment, affective manipulation was restricted to the two positive 
affect conditions with different arousal levels only. Based on the previous results diverging 
influences on proactive control by positive affect with low or high arousal were assumed: The 
CVE in experimental blocks with informative response cues was expected to be reduced in 
the positivelow condition as compared to the positivehigh condition. If positive affect with low 
arousal reduces the usage of informative cues, differences in the additional analyses for trials 
with ambiguous targets are also feasible: There might be less cue-congruent responses in the 
positivelow as compared to the positivehigh condition (frequency analysis), and also less RT 
differences between global or local cues in the positivelow condition. In contrast, no affect 
related performance differences in RTs or error rates were expected in the additional block 
without informative response cues, where a proactive control strategy is not possible. A 
separate exploratory analysis for trials with ambiguous targets only will show whether the 
usually found global processing preference differs between arousal conditions. 
 
3.4.1. Method 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-three undergraduate students from the Regensburg University participated in 
the experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Thirty subjects (see Results for exclusion criteria) 
were included into the final data analysis (age M = 22.87 years, SD = 4.18, range = 18 – 35, 
26 female). All participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session. 
3.4.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and the IAPS picture sets for the positivelow and positivehigh condition were 
the same as in the previous experiments. Again, the y- and m-key were used as left and right 
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response buttons. 
All stimuli in the global-local task were presented centrally in black on a white 
background. Line drawings of the four shapes triangle, diamond, circle, and square in size 69 
x 69 pixels were used to create global figures of the same four kinds of local shapes. This 
resulted in 16 different target stimuli (see Figure 3.5) of the following sizes: 2.7 x 2.3 cm for 
global triangles, 3.2 x 3.2 cm for global diamonds, 2.6 x 2.6 cm for global circles, and 2.6 x 
2.6 cm for global squares. The uppercase letters G and K – presented in font Arial, size 48 – 
were used as response cues for the global or local level: G stood for the German “große 
Form” (meaning big shape), and K for “kleine Form” (meaning small shape). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The 16 different target stimuli used in the global-local task of Experiment 5. The left 
column shows the ambiguous target stimuli, in which the same shape is present on both the local and the global 
level (e.g., big triangle made of small triangles). 
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3.4.1.3. Procedure 
The experiment comprised four experimental blocks with informative response cues 
followed by an additional block without cues. In the cued blocks, each trial of the global-local 
task started with an IAPS picture (400 ms) followed by a blank screen (200 ms) and the 
informative response cue (500 ms). After another blank screen (500 ms) the target stimulus 
appeared and remained on screen until the participant responded. Subjects had to detect 
whether a prespecified target shape was present on the global or the local level. In case of an 
ambiguous target (same shape on both levels) participants could choose freely to which level 
they responded. Feedback (1500 ms) was given for errors only, and each trial ended with an 
intertrial interval of 500 ms. An example trial is visualized in Figure 3.6. Single trial 
procedure in the additional block without cues was the same, except that the response cue was 
replaced by an uninformative fixation cross. 
 
 
 Figure 3.6. Design and procedure of the global-local task used in Experiment 5. 
 
The experiment started with the same relaxation exercise that was also used in the 
previous experiments. Subsequently, a short practice block without IAPS pictures, in which 
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participants had to search for a diamond shape, enabled the participants to get used to the 
global-local task. The practice block included all possible combinations for figures including 
a diamond shape (3 global diamond figures, 3 figures made up from local diamonds, and one 
ambiguous target stimulus with the diamond present on both levels), which were presented 
twice – once preceded by a local cue, and once preceded by a global cue – and in randomized 
order. Data acquisition took place in the following five experimental blocks – the last without 
informative response cues – with 84 trials each. Each block was preceded by a specific 
instruction that informed about the relevant target shape for the upcoming block. In each 
block a different target shape was used with the order of the relevant shape being 
counterbalanced across participants. Target shape of the no-cue block was selected randomly 
between participants. Each block consisted of 36 global targets (3 possible combinations x 
12), 36 local targets (3 possible combination x 12), and 12 ambiguous target stimuli. Half of 
the trials of a given block were cued by a local or a global cue, respectively. In each block, 60 
trials were validly cued (48 correctly predicted global or local targets + 12 cued ambiguous 
targets) and 24 trials invalidly cued. Global and local cues were counterbalanced across all 
stimulus types. Moreover, the 42 positivelow and 42 positivehigh IAPS pictures were evenly 
distributed on the different trial types. Trial order was randomized with the exception that 
immediate repetitions of target stimuli or IAPS pictures were not allowed. The response 
mapping of target level (global or local) to response key (left or right) was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
3.4.1.4. Design 
In the first four experimental blocks with informative response cues, a 2 (Arousal: 
positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) x 2 (Target type: global vs. 
local) design was applied for trials with global or local targets, and a 2 (Arousal: positivelow 
vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue type: global vs. local) design for trials with ambiguous targets. The 
additional experimental block without cues had a 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 3 
(Target type: global vs. local vs. ambiguous) design. All variables were repeated measures 
within participants. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as dependent measures. 
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3.4.2. Results 
3.4.2.1. Data analysis 
The first experimental block of the cued global-local task was declared an additional 
practice block ex post, because RTs were significantly slower than in the following blocks 
(MBlock 1 = 612 ms, MBlock 2 = 537 ms, MBlock 3 = 490 ms, MBlock 4 = 514 ms, MBlock 5 = 482). 
Data preprocessing for the remaining blocks including informative response cues (2-4) and 
the no-cue block was the same as in Experiment 4: Practice trials as well as the first trial of 
each experimental block were excluded from analyses. In addition, error trials, trials 
following an error, and trials with RTs differing more than three standard deviations from 
individual means were also removed prior analysis, which resulted in an exclusion of 10.37 % 
of all trials. Furthermore, data from three subjects were excluded from statistical analyses: 
One participant was exceptionally slow in the experimental blocks including informative 
response cues (835 ms, while mean RTs were 499 ms), one made too many errors in the 
experimental blocks including informative response cues (19.31 %, while mean error rate was 
4.42 %), and one responded extremely slow in the no-cue block (739 ms, while mean RTs 
were 471 ms). The remaining data will be analyzed separately for blocks including 
informative cues, for ambiguous and non-ambiguous trials, and for the no-cue block. 
 
3.4.2.2. Blocks 2 to 4 with informative response cues: global and local 
targets, ambiguous targets 
Global and local targets. Mean RTs (see Table 3.5) were entered into A 2 (Arousal: 
positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) x 2 (Target type: global vs. 
local) repeated measures ANOVA. Significant main effects of Cue validity, F(1, 29) = 6.55, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .184, and Target type, F(1, 29) = 24.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .461, were found. 
Participants responded faster in validly cued trials (499 ms vs. 533 ms), resulting in an overall 
CVE of 35 ms, and faster in trials with global targets (492 ms vs. 539 ms). Furthermore, Cue 
validity significantly interacted with Target type, F(1, 29) = 5.2, p < .05, ηp2 = .152, and – 
more importantly with respect to the hypotheses – also with Arousal, F(1, 29) = 5.0, p < .05, 
ηp
2 = .147. Contrast analyses showed a significant CVE in trials with global targets (462 ms 
vs. 522 ms; F = 7.09, p < .05), but no significant difference in trials with local targets (534 ms 
vs. 544 ms; F < 1, p = .336). Like in the previous experiments (cf., chapters 2.2., 2.3., 3.3.), 
the CVE was significantly smaller in the positivelow condition as compared to the positivehigh 
condition (26 ms vs. 44 ms, see Figure 3.7). The main effect Arousal and all other interactions 
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did not prove reliable (all F < 1.91, all p > .18). 
The same analysis for mean error rates (see Table 3.6) revealed marginal significant 
main effects of Arousal (F = 3.11, p = .088) and Cue validity (F = 4.06, p = .05), which were 
further qualified by a significant interaction of Arousal x Cue validity, F(1, 29) = 6.99, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .194. Contrary to the RT data, single comparisons showed a larger CVE in the 
positivelow condition (3.47 % vs. 6.39 %) as compared to the positivehigh condition (3.68 % vs. 
4.15 %, see Figure 3.7). All other main effects or interactions did not prove reliable (all 
F < 2.04, all p > .16). Mean overall error rate was 4.42 % (SD = 2.88). 
 
Table 3.5. Mean RTs (in ms; SD in parentheses) from trials with global or local targets in the cued 
global-local task of Experiment 5 (experimental blocks 2-4) as a function of Arousal, Cue validity, and Target 
type. 
 Arousal condition 
 positivelow positivehigh 
Target Cue valid invalid valid invalid 
global 466 (80.1) 519 (132.7) 459 (73.9) 525 (146.9) 
local 533 (76.9) 531 (84.4) 535 (85.9) 557 (110.1) 
 
Table 3.6. Mean error rates (in %; SD in parentheses) from trials with global or local targets in the cued 
global-local task of Experiment 5 (experimental blocks 2-4) as a function of Arousal, Cue validity, and Target 
type. 
 Arousal condition 
 positivelow positivehigh 
Target Cue valid invalid valid invalid 
global 3.24 (3.5) 7.22 (6.71) 3.61 (5.27) 4.7 (5.32) 
local 3.7 (3.54) 5.56 (6.84) 3.76 (3.42) 3.6 (6.13) 
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Figure 3.7. Mean cue validity effects (CVE) in the cued global-local task of Experiment 5 as a function 
of Arousal. The left panel (A) represents CVE differences in RTs (in ms), the right panel (B) represents CVE 
differences in error rates (in %). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Due to the oppositional response patterns between positive affect with low or high 
arousal in RTs and error rates, additional analyses on potential speed-accuracy trade-offs were 
conducted. Therefore, individual Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients r were 
determined between RTs and error rates of all factor combinations, and tested for 
significance. Of the entire sample of 30 participants only 6 subjects showed a significant 
correlation between RTs and error rates (rmin = -.643, rmax = .842, all p < .05), whereof only 
one correlation was negative (r = -.643) and thus in line with a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Overall, there was a marginal significant positive correlation, t(28) = 1.83, p = .079 (two-
tailed), between RTs and error rates with a mean r of .157 (SD = .462) indicating that more 
subjects showed a response pattern with slower RTs associated with more errors and faster 
RTs associated with fewer errors (see Appendix B for individual rs from all participants of 
Experiment 5). 
Ambiguous targets. Mean RTs (see Table 3.7) of the trials with ambiguous target 
stimuli were entered into a 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue type: global vs. 
local) repeated measures ANOVA. A significant main effect of Cue type, F(1, 29) = 9.28, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .243, was found. Participants responded faster after global cues (444 ms vs. 
489 ms). The main effect of Affect and the interaction of Arousal x Cue type did not prove 
reliable (all F < 1.2, all p > .28). Descriptively, however, RTs following global cues differed 
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less from RTs following local cues in the positivelow condition (34 ms) as compared to the 
positivehigh condition (57 ms).  
 
Table 3.7. Mean RTs (in ms; SD in parentheses) in trials with ambiguous targets in the cued global-
local task of Experiment 5 (experimental blocks 2-4) as a function of Arousal and Cue type. 
 Arousal condition 
Cue positivelow positivehigh 
global 452 (98.9) 436 (80.3) 
local 486 (148.1) 493 (115.8) 
 
 
3.4.2.3. No-cue block: RT data and error data 
A 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 3 (Target type: global vs. local vs. 
ambiguous) repeated measures ANOVA for mean RTs (see Table 3.8) revealed a significant 
main effect of Target type, F(1, 29) = 11.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .292. Contrast analyses showed 
that participants responded significantly slower in trials with local targets (509 ms) as 
compared to trials with global targets (456 ms; F = 16.39, p < .001) or ambiguous targets 
(449 ms; F = 16.8, p < .001). RTs in trials with global targets did not differ significantly from 
RTs in trials with ambiguous targets (F < 1, p = .58). The main effect of Arousal and the 
interaction Arousal x Target type did not prove reliable (all F < 1, all p > .55). By definition 
errors were not possible in trials with ambiguous targets. Therefore only error rates from trials 
with global or local targets (see Table 3.8) were analyzed with a 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. 
positivehigh) x 2 (Target type: global vs. local) repeated measures ANOVA. No significant 
main effects or interactions were found (all F < 1, all p > .41). Mean overall error rate was 
4.0 % (SD = 3.16). 
No significant affective modulations were found in the additional block without 
informative response cues, where a proactive control strategy could not have been applied. To 
address the problem of interpreting non-significant results, JZS-Bayes factors were again 
calculated for RT and error rates comparisons between the positivelow and positivehigh 
condition. JZS-Bayes factors ranged from 3.1 to 7.08 meaning that the null hypotheses – no 
differences as a function of affect condition – were indeed more likely. 
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Table 3.8. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the no-cue block of Experiment 5 as a function of 
Arousal and Target type. 
 Arousal condition 
 positivelow positivehigh 
Target global  local ambiguous global local ambiguous 
RT (SD) 450 (89.2) 505 (78.9) 453 (86.8) 462 (94.3) 512 (72.7) 446 (114.6) 
Errors (SD) 3.92 (5.86) 4.77 (5.56)  3.93 (4.91) 3.43 (3.97)  
 
 
3.4.2.4. Frequency analyses of trials with ambiguous targets 
In trials with ambiguous targets participants could freely choose, whether to respond 
to the global or the local level. In this special situation of free choice it is possible to consider 
not only RT measures but also measures regarding response choice. This enables the 
following theoretically interesting additional analyses: For experimental blocks including 
informative response cues (blocks 2-4), it is possible to analyze to what extent responses 
followed the preceding cue, which is, therefore, another way of testing how arousal modulates 
cue usage. Furthermore, analyzing response choice in the no-cue block enables the 
investigation of possible differences in global processing preference under different arousal 
conditions. In the no-cue block, participants were not only free to choose the local or global 
shape but also not influenced by preceding cues. Therefore, the percentage of global 
responses in trials with ambiguous targets is a direct measure of global processing 
preferences. 
Percentage of cue-congruent responses (ambiguous trials of experimental blocks 2-4). 
A 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh) x 2 (Cue type: global vs. local) repeated measures 
ANOVA for mean percentages of cue-congruent responses revealed a significant main effect 
of Cue type, F(1, 29) = 35.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .553. Ambiguous targets following global cues 
were responded with a global response in 85.3 % of the trials, whereas after local cues 
participants responded to the local level in only 21.4 % of the trials. The main effect of 
Arousal and the interaction of Arousal x Cue type did not prove reliable (all F < 1.51, all 
p > .23). So, irrespective of the kind of cue or arousal condition, participants preferentially 
responded to the global level, when having free choice of response. 
Percentage of global responses (ambiguous trials of the no-cue block). There was a 
clear-cut global processing preference with an overall mean of 89.14 % global responses 
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(SD = 24.4 %) in trials with ambiguous targets. Global processing preference did not differ 
significantly between the positivelow (M = 90 %) and the positivehigh condition (M = 88.3 %; 
t < 1, p = .47). 
 
3.4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 5 showed that positive affect with low or high arousal has diverging 
influences on the CVE also with a within-participants affect manipulation: Interestingly, the 
RT analysis replicated the results of Experiments 1, 2, and 4 with a reduced CVE under 
positive affect with low arousal, whereas the analysis of error rates showed an opposite 
response pattern with a reduced CVE in the positivehigh condition. The separate analysis of 
trials with ambiguous targets, at least descriptively, corresponded with the CVE results in RTs 
by indicating that RTs differ less between different cues – global vs. local – in the positivelow 
condition as compared to the positivehigh condition. As expected, no affective modulations 
were found in the no-cue block, where a proactive control strategy was not possible. 
Moreover, in line with results from Navon (1977) and Gasper and Clore (2002) this additional 
block showed a typical global processing preference with slower RTs in trials with local 
targets as compared to trials with global or ambiguous targets. Also, the additional analyses of 
trials with ambiguous targets, where participants were free to respond to either level in the 
global-local task, suggested a general global processing preference: Under free choice, 
subjects predominantly responded to the global level – irrespective of affect condition and 
even after local cues. 
In line with results from the previous experiments presented in this thesis, affective 
modulations in the global-local task of Experiment 5 were again only found in experimental 
blocks including informative cues, that is, where a proactive control strategy can be used to 
optimize performance (cf. Braver et al., 2007). The RT analysis of trials with global or local 
targets showed that with a within-participants affect manipulation positive affect with low 
arousal still reduced the CVE, which indicates less usage of the cues and consequently less 
proactive control. However, the analysis of error rates showed a reduced CVE in the 
positivehigh condition. At first sight, this response pattern with oppositional effects in RTs and 
error rates suggests a speed-accuracy trade-off with a shift in response criterion between the 
two arousal conditions. Subsequent analyses, however, did not support this assumption. Only 
one subject showed a significant negative correlation between RTs and error rates, whereas 
five participants even showed significant positive correlations. Therefore, the question 
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remains, why the diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal were of 
different direction in RTs and error rates. Such an oppositional response pattern was not 
present in any of the experiments presented in the previous chapters: Experiments 2 and 4 
revealed no affective influences on error rates at all, and Experiment 1 – where the CVE 
difference in RTs between positivelow and positivehigh group was on the threshold of 
significance – showed parallel response patterns in RTs and error rates with a significantly 
reduced CVE in error rates under positive affect with low arousal. Experiment 1 and the 
present Experiment 5 differed in terms of affect manipulation as well as task. Thus, the 
differences in results might be due to diverging effects of sustained versus transient affect 
induction, special characteristics of the spatial response cueing task as compared to the cued 
global-local task, or a combination of both. Since a reverse CVE pattern in error rates was 
also not present in Experiments 2 and 4, which also used a between groups affect 
manipulation but differed in task, diverging effects of sustained versus transient affect 
induction seem to be the most likely explanation.  
For example, Kazen and Kuhl (1999) also used a within-participants affect 
manipulation – thereby most likely inducing transient affective reactions – and found, 
somewhat similar to the present Experiment 5, oppositional effects in RTs and error rates 
(also not explainable with a speed-accuracy trade-off) in their Experiment 1 about influences 
of positive affect on the Stroop effect: Positive affective prime words as compared to neutral 
and negative words significantly reduced Stroop interference in the first of two consecutive 
Stroop tasks in RTs, but significantly increased error rates in the longest SOA condition 
(2250 ms). Because of the fact that this oppositional response pattern was restricted to the 
longest SOA only, the authors suggested that positive affect might increase impulsive 
tendencies over time. This hypothesis was, however, not discussed in more detail, because 
this effect was no longer present in the following experiments of this study. The present cued 
global-local experiment and Kazen and Kuhl’s Experiment 1 are aside from the within-
participants affect manipulation procedure hardly comparable. Kuhl and Kazen varied 
different valence conditions only and not different arousal conditions, they used affective 
words and not pictures, and participants had to respond to two consecutive Stroop tasks per 
trial, what most likely requires reactive control, and not a cued global-local task, where most 
likely proactive control is involved. Nonetheless, the idea of increased error rates as an 
indicator of increased impulsivity is interesting, because it seems to fit with current theories 
on cognitive control: The DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007) as well as the 
stability-flexibility framework (Goschke, 2003) assume that each cognitive control strategy is 
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associated with specific behavioral costs: For example, less proactive control or less stability 
is associated with increased flexibility but also more impulsivity and distractibility (e.g., 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Therefore, a reduced dependence on informative cues 
accompanied by more impulsivity indicated by oppositional response pattern in RTs and error 
rates under positive affect with low arousal – and the reverse response pattern under positive 
affect with high arousal – might just be a natural consequence of the diverging influences of 
positive affect with different arousal levels on proactive control3
More clear-cut are the results of Experiment 5 regarding the main question of Part II 
of this thesis, namely whether positive affect with different arousal levels modulates proactive 
or reactive control. Even though a new task and a within-participant affect manipulation was 
used, significant affective modulations were once again – in line with the experiments 
reported above – only found in experimental blocks including informative response cues, that 
is, where a proactive control strategy could be used to optimize performance. The inclusion of 
trials with ambiguous targets, where participants were free to choose the local or global 
response allowed new analyses concerning the usage of informative cues besides the CVE. 
However, for ambiguous trials, no significant differences between positive affect with low or 
high arousal were found neither in RTs nor in percentage of cue-congruent responses. The 
latter analysis only confirmed a general global processing preference even after local cues, but 
no affective modulation thereof. However, at least descriptively, the RT difference between 
local and global cues preceding ambiguous targets was less pronounced in the positivelow 
condition, which might be another sign of less cue usage under positive affect with low 
arousal as it parallels the affective differences in CVE performance found in RT analyses 
before (namely, in trials with global or local targets of the present experiment as well as in RT 
analyses of Experiments 1, 2, and 4 of the present thesis). The mere descriptive affective 
. However, this speculation 
cannot explain, why this response pattern was only found in Experiment 5. Maybe the 
additional sustained affective influence in Experiments 1, 2, and 4 due to the between-groups 
affect manipulation had some kind of compensatory effect that was not possible with a 
randomized within-participants affect manipulation. But of course, based on the results from a 
single experiment alone, each explanation remains only speculative in nature. Further 
experiments using within-participants affect manipulations will have to show whether this 
specific response pattern can be replicated, before any final conclusions are possible. 
                                                     
3 For this speculation to be valid, RTs and error rates have to be assumed to be influenced – at least partially – by 
different cognitive processes. A recent study (van Ede, de Lange, & Maris, 2012) showed that in paradigms 
using informative cues this might indeed be the case. 
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modulation in trials with ambiguous targets might be a consequence of insufficient statistical 
power: In the cued global-local task used here, trials with ambiguous targets were presented 
rarely (12 per experimental block), and even less trials remain when regarding trials with 
global or local cues separately (3 trials per factor combination in each experimental block, 
i.e., 9 trials over the whole experiment). 
Taken together, results from the experimental blocks including informative response 
cues strengthened the assumption of diverging influences of positive affect with low or high 
arousal specifically on proactive control. However, the inverse response pattern – as 
compared to previous experiments reported in this thesis – in error rates analysis of CVEs as 
well as the mere descriptive affective differences of cue effects in trials with ambiguous 
targets strongly recommend a replication study. 
Global processing is generally preferred to local processing (cf., Navon, 1977). 
Moreover, this preference has been shown to be increased under positive affect (Gasper & 
Clore, 2002). Therefore, a secondary question of the present experiment was, whether positive 
affect with low or high arousal further modulates this global processing preference. The above 
discussed results from experimental blocks including informative cues already indicated that 
both positive affect conditions are associated with a strong, comparable preference for global 
processing. Analysis of free choices on ambiguous targets in the no-cue block further 
confirmed this null-effect. Without pre-cues, participants showed an unequivocal preference 
for the global level, which did not differ between both arousal conditions. Taken together, 
these results suggest that differences in arousal have no major influence on the increased 
global processing preference under positive affect.  
 
 
3.5. Discussion of Experiments 3 to 5 
Part II of the present thesis gathered converging evidence over three different 
experiments in favor of the assumption that positive affect modulates proactive and not 
reactive control: (1) In the spatial response cueing paradigm of Experiment 3 uninformative 
cues (50 % cue validity) were presented, so that performance could no longer be optimized by 
a proactive control strategy like in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, the CVE in Experiment 3 
could be interpreted as a measure of reactive control. No affective modulation of the CVE and 
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as such, no modulation of reactive control was found. (2) Experiment 4 considered both 
reactive (in terms of switch costs) and proactive control (in terms of the CVE) in a single 
experiment using the task switching paradigm, first without task cues and afterwards with 
informative task cues included. No affective modulation was found in mere task switching 
performance, that is, participants of all affect groups showed comparable switch costs when 
no cues were presented, which indicates no differences in reactive control. But, like in 
Experiments 1 and 2, affect modulated the CVE, indicating less usage of informative cues and 
thereby reduced proactive control under positive affect with low arousal as compared to 
positive affect with high arousal. (3) Last but not least, Experiment 5 – the first experiment 
presented here using a within-participants affect manipulation – provided further evidence for 
the affective modulation of proactive control. Performance in a global-local task was only 
modulated by affect, when proactive control was involved (in experimental blocks including 
informative response cues), but no affective modulation was found, when a proactive control 
strategy was not possible (in the no-cue block). Interestingly, results from Experiment 5 
showed a reduced CVE under positive affect with low arousal as compared to positive affect 
with high arousal in RTs, but a reversed response pattern in error rates. The RT data 
replicated results from Experiments 1, 2, and 4, which all used a between groups affect 
manipulation. Thus, this specific positive affect effect seems to be quite robust, as it has been 
found with different kinds of tasks (a spatial response cueing, a task switching, and a global-
local task), different kinds of informative cues (response cues or task cues), and different 
kinds of affect manipulation (sustained or transient). The fact that besides Experiment 5 no 
other experiment found a reverse affective influence on the CVE in error rates suggests that 
this difference might be due to different affect induction procedures, because only 
Experiment 5 manipulated affect within participants. 
Results from Part I were interpreted as a sign of increased flexibility under positive 
affect with low arousal in form of an increased ability to overcome predominant response 
tendencies. Based on the results of Part II this interpretation is no longer tenable. Instead of an 
increase of reactive control – which would have corresponded to an increased ability to 
overcome predominant response tendencies –, evidence for a reduction of proactive control 
under positive affect with low arousal was found. However, depending on the specific 
definition of cognitive flexibility, this positive affect effect can still be interpreted as 
increased flexibility: For example, Compton, Wirtz, Pajoumand, Claus and Heller (2004) 
argued that a reduced CVE – in a paradigm with informative cues – is also a kind of 
flexibility, because the behavior is less dependent on the cue information. Comparable to the 
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experiments presented here, the authors found (using an attentional orienting paradigm) 
slower responses after validly cued targets and faster responses following invalidly cued 
targets under positive affect. Mood was measured via the Profile of Mood states (Mc Nair, 
Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) –, and they found no influence of negative affect on attentional 
orienting but a reduced CVE under positive affect. Taken together, results from the present 
thesis fit with the existing literature on increased flexibility under positive affect, but it seems 
to be flexibility in terms of an enhanced independence from context information (i.e., reduced 
proactive control), specifically under positive affect in combination with low arousal. 
 
 
3.6. Interim Summary 
Results from Experiments 4 and 5 replicated diverging effects of positive affect in 
combination with low or high arousal. Furthermore, Part II of the present thesis showed that 
positive affect specifically modulates proactive and not reactive control: Low arousing 
positive affect reduces proactive control, while high arousing positive affect seems to increase 
proactive control. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Part III: How positive affect modulates cognitive control: novelty 
bias and distractibility 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Positive affect is assumed to increase cognitive flexibility (cf., Ashby et al., 1999; 
Ashby et al., 2002). The experiments presented so far showed a reduction of proactive control 
under positive affect with low arousal. This result is in line with the assumption of increased 
flexibility under positive affect, because reduced proactive control means that the behavior is 
less dependent on context information (see also Dreisbach, 2006). According to current 
theories on cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007; Goschke, 2003) each control 
strategy – proactive versus reactive control or stability versus flexibility – is associated with a 
behavioral trade-off: For example, less proactive control or flexibility is associated with 
benefits in form of less perseveration but also with costs in form of increased impulsivity and 
distractibility, resulting in a higher vulnerability to interference by task-irrelevant information. 
Therefore, positive affect with low arousal should not only increase flexibility or reduce 
proactive control, but also increase distractibility at the same time. The oppositional results in 
RT and error rates found in Experiment 5 might be explained within this framework. But, of 
course, it is problematic to draw such conclusions based on a single experiment alone – 
especially as such a response pattern was not present in all other experiments presented here. 
But two previous studies by Dreisbach (2006) and Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) 
showed converging evidence on behavioral trade-offs under positive affect with a comparable 
low arousal level as in the present studies: In a cognitive set-switching task (Dreisbach 
& Goschke, 2004), participants under positive affect showed increased flexibility and less 
perseveration in one switching condition, but also more distractibility in another switching 
condition, where new information had to be ignored. And in an AX-CPT paradigm 
(Dreisbach, 2006), positive affect resulted in costs, when a to be maintained goal had to be 
executed (BX and BY trials; less stability) and benefits when a to be maintained goal 
unexpectedly changed (AY trials; more flexibility). This short review (see Chapter 1.3. for a 
more detailed review) demonstrates that it is not sufficient to consider only increased 
flexibility under positive affect without regarding the corresponding behavioral costs, when 
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investigating how positive affect modulates cognitive control. Therefore, Part III of the 
present thesis will focus on the costs of positive affect with low arousal, namely increased 
distractibility in particular. 
 
 
4.2. Experiment 6: Stroop-like word-picture interference task with 
familiar and new distractors 
Goal of Experiment 6 was to investigate a specific hypothesis concerning the 
increased distractibility under positive affect, which originated from a study by Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004): Therein the authors used a paradigm including two switching conditions 
with different color changes of targets and task-irrelevant distractors: After the switch, either 
the targets appeared in a new color, while the former target color became the distractor color 
(perseveration condition), or the distractors appeared in a new color, while the former 
distractor color became the target color (learned irrelevance condition). Positive affect was 
found to reduce or virtually eliminate switch costs in the perseveration condition, where 
subjects had to switch to a new task dimension. On the other hand, positive affect increased 
switch cost – especially in incompatible trials – in the learned irrelevance condition, where 
subjects had to ignore a new task dimension. Based on these results the authors speculated an 
enhanced vulnerability for the processing of novel stimuli, that is, an increased novelty bias, 
under positive affect. So far, however, this specific hypothesis has never been tested 
empirically. 
To directly address this question of an increased novelty bias under positive affect, 
Experiment 6 compared performance under positive affect with low arousal with a neutral 
affect group – with matched arousal levels – in a Stroop-like word-picture interference task 
with familiar and new distractors. In this paradigm, compound word-picture stimuli were used 
with the words always serving as targets and the pictures always being the distractors. 
Subjects had to respond to the target words with a left or right button press according to single 
stimulus-response (S-R) assignments. Specific arbitrary S-R assignments were chosen, so that 
participants would not be able to respond by using a simpler, binary categorization rule (task 
set), which has repeatedly been shown to prevent response interference by irrelevant 
distractors (see Dreisbach, 2012, for a review). Familiar distractors in the present experiment 
were pictorial representations of the target words – presented very frequently throughout the 
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experiment –, while spatially left or right oriented animal pictures – unrelated to the target 
words and presented rarely and irregularly – were used as new distractors. Both distractor 
types could be compatible or incompatible with respect to the required response, that is, the 
depicted object (familiar distractors) or the spatial orientation of the animal (new distractors) 
could match or mismatch with the response mapping of a given target word. Following the 
hypothesis of an increased novelty bias under positive affect, it was assumed that participants 
in the positive affect group should be more distractible than participants in the neutral affect 
group, particularly by new distractors. 
 
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
51 subjects participated in the experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Thereof 41 
participants (see Results for exclusion criteria) were included into the final data analysis 
(Mean age = 24.61 years, SD = 6.21, range = 17-47, 27 female). All participants were German 
native speakers. Subjects were assigned randomly to the positive (n = 19) or neutral affect 
group (n = 22). All participants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session.  
4.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus was the same as in the previous experiments. The y- and m-key were again 
used as left and right response buttons. 
Four German words served as target stimuli – “Trommel” (drum), “Bluse” (blouse), 
“Waage” (scales), and “Schemel” (stool) – and were presented in front of standardized black-
and-white line drawings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). To assure that both the words and 
the picture stimuli were recognizable in the compound word-picture stimuli, words were 
presented in purple, font size 32 pt, and the picture stimuli were all adjusted to a size of 240 x 
240 pixel. The picture stimuli were always distractors and never served as targets. The words 
drum and blouse were mapped to the left (right) response key, and scale and stool were 
mapped to the right (left) key. Response mapping of the S-R assignments to the left and right 
key was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Four distractors depicted the same objects that were also used as target words (familiar 
distractors, see Figure 4.2 A). Another 24 distractors showed spatially oriented – 12 to the left 
side, 12 to the right side – animals (new distractors, see Figure 4.2 B). All possible 
CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT 6  89 
 
combinations of target words and familiar distractors (4 x 4) were used in the experiment. The 
24 new distractors were evenly distributed amongst the four target words. As a consequence, 
in the entire experiment half of the target words had compatible distractors (i.e., the depicted 
familiar object or the spatial orientation of the animal matched the response mapping of the 
target word), whereas the other half had incompatible distractors. Examples of compound 
stimuli with compatible and incompatible distractors are given in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Examples of word-picture stimuli. The left column shows response compatible compound 
stimuli, the right column response incompatible compound stimuli. 
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Figure 4.2. Line drawings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) used as distractors: The upper panel (A) 
shows all four familiar distractors. The lower panel (B) shows all 24 left- or right-oriented animals used as new 
distractors. 
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Ten new IAPS pictures (see Table A1, Appendix A) were selected for the neutral 
affect group in Experiment 6: Like the previous neutral set, the new selection also had neutral 
valence levels (M = 5.1, SD = 0.48) but in combination with a higher arousal level (M = 4.48, 
SD = 0.56), which matched the arousal level of the positivelow picture set (see Table 2.1, 
Chapter 2.2.). Furthermore, both the neutral and the positive picture set were matched for the 
number of pictures depicting animals to prevent a possible confound due to the line drawings 
of animals serving as new distractors. 
4.2.1.3. Procedure 
Each trial of the word-picture interference task started with the presentation of an 
IAPS picture for 350 ms. After a short blank screen (150 ms) the compound stimulus 
appeared and remained visible until the participant pressed the corresponding response key. 
Feedback (1500 ms) was given for errors only. Each trial ended with an intertrial interval of 
1000 ms. Participants were instructed to react as fast as possible while avoiding errors. An 
example trial is visualized in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Design and procedure of a single trial of the word-picture interference task in Experiment 6. 
 
The experiment was divided into two blocks, each consisting of 252 trials (15 x all 16 
combinations of target words and familiar distractors + 12 trials with new distractors). Trial 
order was random with the following restrictions: To ensure the novelty effect of the new 
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distractors, each new distractor was shown only once throughout the experiment and there 
was a mean distance of 20 trials (minimum 10, maximum 30 trials) between two trials with 
new distractors. The 12 new distractors per block included six left oriented and six right 
oriented animals, thereof three with a response compatible target word and three with an 
incompatible word. Consecutive repetitions of target words, distractor pictures, or IAPS 
pictures were not allowed.  
Experiment 6 started with the same relaxation exercise that was also used in the 
previous experiments. In the following instructions participants were told to learn all four S-R 
assignments by heart and were instructed to respond to the words only. Subsequently, eight 
practice trials without IAPS pictures enabled the participants to get used to the Stroop-like 
word-picture interference task. In this first practice block, each target word was shown twice, 
once with a familiar, compatible distractor and once with a familiar, incompatible distractor. 
This was followed by another 16, now randomized practice trials (4 target words x 4 familiar 
distractors) with IAPS pictures included. Data acquisition took place in the subsequent two 
experimental blocks, which additionally included the 24 trials with new distractors. After the 
experiment a short interview followed to identify participants with self-generated task sets. 
Therein all subjects were asked whether they used a certain rule or strategy for memorizing 
the assignments of target words and corresponding responses. 
4.2.1.4. Design 
A 2 (Affect: neutral vs. positive) x 2 (Distractor type: familiar vs. new) x 2 (Distractor 
compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) mixed factors design was used. Affect was 
manipulated between participants. Distractor type and compatibility were repeated measures 
within participants. RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) served as dependent measures. 
 
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Data analysis 
Like in the previous experiments, practice trials, the first trial of each experimental 
block, error trials, trials following an error, and trials with RTs differing more than three 
standard deviations from individual means were excluded from analyses, which resulted in 
exclusion of 11.33 % of all trials. Furthermore, the data of one participant were excluded, 
because of too many errors (> 50 % error rate). Another two subjects had to be excluded due 
to slow performance far below the group mean (M = 947 ms vs. Mpositive = 622 ms; M = 1135 
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ms vs. Mneutral = 596 ms). Furthermore, in spite of the single S-R instructions seven 
participants (two in the neutral group, and five in the positive group) were able to generate a 
task set on their own (e.g., “Drücke links, wenn man sich draufstellen kann [d.h. Schemel, 
Waage]” [“press left, if one can step on it {i.e., stool, scales}”]). These participants were also 
excluded because the application of self-generated task rules – like instructed task rules – has 
repeatedly been shown to eliminate interference by irrelevant distractors like spatially 
oriented animals (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009, Experiments 1 and 2; Dreisbach, 2012). For the 
remaining 41 participants mean RTs and error rates of each design cell (see Table 4.1) were 
entered into separate mixed factors ANOVAs. 
 
Table 4.1. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the word-picture interference task of 
Experiment 6 (SD in parentheses) as a factor of Affect group, Distractor type, and Distractor compatibility. 
 
Affect group 
 neutral positive 
Distractor familiar new familiar new 
 RT (SD) 
compatible 560 (63.2) 616 (90.1) 566 (71.0) 666 (141.3) 
incompatible 578 (69.0) 630 (87.9) 592 (90.8) 668 (115.1) 
 Errors (SD) 
compatible 3.08 (3.04) 4.54 (5.59) 3.26 (2.28) 4.39 (8.04) 
incompatible 4.91 (3.54) 2.65 (4.73) 5.1 (2.71) 3.94 (5.81) 
 
4.2.2.2. RT data 
A 2 (Affect: neutral vs. positive) x 2 (Distractor type: familiar vs. new) x 2 (Distractor 
compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) mixed factors ANOVA revealed significant main 
effects of Distractor type, F(1, 39) = 81.49, p  < .001, ηp2 = .676, and Distractor compatibility, 
F(1, 39) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .107. Participants responded slower in trials with new 
distractors (645 ms vs. 574 ms) and also with incompatible distractors (617 vs. 602 ms). More 
importantly with respect to the hypotheses, there was a significant interaction of Affect x 
Distractor type, F(1, 39) = 4.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .106. Both affect groups showed increased RTs 
with new distracters, but more so in the positive group (mean slowdown = 88 ms) than in the 
neutral group (mean slowdown = 54 ms; see Figure 4.4). No further significant effects were 
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found (all F < 1.03, all p > .32).  
 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean RTs (in ms) in the word-picture interference task of Experiment 6 as a function of 
Affect group and Distractor type. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
4.2.2.3. Error data 
In the same analyses for mean error rates only a significant interaction of Distractor 
type x Distractor compatibility, F(1, 39) = 7.27, p < .05, ηp2 = .156, was found. Planned 
comparisons showed that a typical compatibility effect was present for familiar distractors 
(3.17 % vs. 5.01 %, F(1, 39) = 33.42, p < .001) but not for new distractors (4.46 % vs. 
3.29 %, F = 1.5, p = .23). All main effects as well as all other interactions did not prove 
reliable (all F < 0.68, all p > .42). Mean overall error rate was 3.97 % (SD = 3.57). 
For the sake of completeness: The same analyses for RTs and error rates without 
exclusion of participants with a self-generated task set showed basically the same results with 
one exception: The theoretically very important interaction of Affect x Distrator type in RTs 
was less pronounced and no longer significant (F = 2.52, p = .119). Mean slowdown by new 
distractors as compared to familiar distractors in the positive group was reduced to 77 ms. 
Complete descriptive and inferential statistics are included in Appendix C (Tables C1 to C3). 
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4.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 6 showed a general interference effect in form of slower RTs in trials with 
new distractors as compared to trials with familiar distractors. As expected, this interruptive 
effect of novel stimuli was more pronounced under positive affect. Furthermore, 
Experiment 6 found a descriptively small but significant main effect of Distractor 
compatibility on RTs, whereas in the error data, the typical compatibility effect – benefits in 
compatible trials and costs in incompatible trials – was only present in trials with familiar 
distractors, but absent in trials with new distractors. 
Experiment 6 was run to test the hypothesis of an increased novelty bias under positive 
affect which originated from a study by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004). To assure that any 
differences between the two affect groups would be interpretable as a true valence effect a 
new neutral affect control group was used, in which affect was manipulated with neutral IAPS 
pictures that were matched to the arousal levels of the positivelow picture set. Furthermore, 
picture sets for both affect groups were matched for the number of pictures depicting animals, 
because line drawings of spatially oriented animals served as new distractors. This procedure 
should prevent that an effect of Distractor type would be explainable as an induced animal 
bias. Therefore, the interaction of Affect x Distractor type can indeed be taken as evidence for 
an increased novelty bias under positive affect with low arousal as compared to neutral affect: 
While both affect groups showed slower responses in trials with new distractors as compared 
to trials with familiar distractors, this slowdown was more pronounced in the positive affect 
group indicating an increased sensitivity for novel stimuli. Interestingly, this valence based 
difference in the novelty bias was reduced and no longer significant, when participants with a 
self-generated task set were included into the statistical analysis. Task sets are simple, binary 
categorization rules, in which relevant stimulus and response features are specified (e.g., if 
stimulus is a consonant, press left, and if stimulus is a vowel, press right). Furthermore, 
several studies showed a shielding function of task sets (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Dreisbach 
& Haider, 2009; Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011; Reisenauer & Dreisbach, 2012; see also 
Dreisbach, 2012 for a review): In contrast to single S-R assignments (e.g., if “A” appears, 
press right, if “B” appears, press left, if “C” appears, press left…), task sets prevent response 
interference by irrelevant distractors, that is, stimuli that are not part of the present task 
representation. Regarding the paradigm of Experiment 6, this means that a task rule enables 
shielding of new distractors, which were not semantically related to the target words and 
consequently did not share relevant stimulus features. That is, in this paradigm the shielding 
function of a task rule should counteract the novelty bias, which perfectly explains why an 
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increased novelty bias under positive affect could no longer be detected, when participants 
with a self-generated task set were included. It is, however, theoretically interesting and 
noteworthy, that the shielding function of task sets seems to outweigh the distractibility 
incurred by positive affect. 
Another interesting result in this context is the fact that five participants from the 
positive group but only two from the neutral group were able to generate a task set on their 
own. This fits with results from previous studies showing enhanced performance in creative 
problem solving tasks in association with positive affect (e.g., Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994; 
Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985). For example, 
participants under positive affect generated more correct solutions in the Remote Associates 
Test, which bears some resemblance to finding a task rule in the present experiment. Thus, 
although Experiment 6 was specifically aimed at finding an increased novelty bias under 
positive affect, it nonetheless gathered further evidence for an increase in cognitive flexibility 
under positive affect – at least descriptively. So, like results from Dreisbach and Goschke 
(2004) and Dreisbach (2006), Experiment 6 fits with and endorses the assumption that 
favoring a specific cognitive control strategy is accompanied with corresponding behavioral 
costs (cf., Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007; Goschke, 2003): That is, if positive affect 
increases flexibility, it should consequently also increase distractibility, and vice versa. 
The distractor compatibility effect in Experiment 6 was descriptively rather small and 
statistically non significant for error rates in trials with new distractors. Also in RTs the 
compatibility effect was more pronounced in trials with familiar distractors (23 ms vs. 8 ms in 
trials with new distractors). This might be a consequence of the procedural precautions taken 
to assure the novelty effect of new distractors. Practice blocks did not include trials with new 
distractors, and their appearance in experimental blocks was rare and irregular. Experiment 3 
from a study by Dreisbach and Haider (2009), which used a similar paradigm to the one used 
here, found that stable, well-practiced S-R assignments are able to prevent interference from 
irrelevant information comparable to the shielding function of task sets. So, maybe the special 
procedure used here resulted in establishing such stable S-R assignments that diminished the 
vulnerability to compatibility effects in trials with new distractors. However, in the Dreisbach 
and Haider study, those stable S-R assignments were established in an experimental practice 
block with 128 trials, where no distractors – neither semantically related nor unrelated – were 
presented, which was not the case in the present experiment. Therefore, it is arguable, whether 
the results from Dreisbach and Haider are really applicable to the present results. An 
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alternative explanation might be that this small compatibility effect especially in trials with 
new distractors is simply a consequence of the successfully induced novelty effect: Task-
irrelevant spatial information – like the orientation of the animals in trials with new distractors 
– automatically induces a spatially congruent response tendency (cf., Eimer, 1995; see also 
Rueda et al., 2004; Tucker & Ellis, 1998), which decays over time. The presentation of new 
distractors had a disruptive effect on performance with a significant slowdown in RTs in both 
affect groups. Therefore, only a diminished spatial compatibility effect might have been left 
with such delayed responses. 
 
 
4.3. Interim Summary 
Part III of the present thesis focused on the costs of positive affect in form of increased 
distractibility. More precisely, Experiment 6 tested the hypothesis that positive affect 
specifically increases the vulnerability to interference by novel information. Results revealed 
indeed an increased novelty bias under positive affect with low arousal as compared to a 
(arousal matched) neutral affect group. Furthermore, results of Experiment 6 indicated that 
increased distractibility and increased flexibility are two sides of the same coin, which 
endorses current theories on cognitive control (cf., Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007; 
Goschke, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 5 General Discussion 
The main aim of the present thesis was to gather further insight into the affective 
modulation of cognitive control. Results from the studies presented here replicate and exceed 
the existing literature on increased cognitive flexibility under positive affect (cf., Ashby et al., 
1999; Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 
2004; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999;van Wouwe et al., 2011) by showing very 
specific affective influences: (1) Converging evidence was found for dissociating effects of 
positive affect in combination with low or high arousal indicating not only valence specific 
but also arousal specific positive affect effects. Therefore, and in line with Russell’s 
circumplex model of affect (e.g., Posner et al., 2005; Russell, 1980), any investigation of 
positive affect effects should consider both dimensions of affect, namely, valence and arousal. 
(2) According to the DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007) cognitive control 
can be differentiated into proactive and reactive control: Proactive control means sustained 
preparation for an upcoming event – for example, by using informative cues to optimize 
performance –, while reactive control means a just-in-time activation of control as soon as a 
demanding event appears. A series of five Experiments (see Chapters 2.2. to 3.4.) using 
different paradigms and cues gathered converging evidence that positive affect specifically 
modulates proactive control and not reactive control. Positive affect with low arousal – but 
not positive affect with high arousal – consistently reduced proactive control as indicated by a 
reduced CVE. Although the “classical” interpretation of increased cognitive flexibility would 
have suggested an increase in reactive control, this result is still interpretable as increased 
flexibility. A behavior that is less reliant on informative cues is consequently also more 
flexible, because it is less dependent on in advance information (cf., Compton et al., 2004). 
(3) According to current theories on cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007; 
Goschke, 2003) increased flexibility or reduced proactive control is associated with 
corresponding behavioral costs. In line with these theories positive affect has been shown to 
increase distractibility and reduce maintenance capability (cf., Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach 
& Goschke, 2004). More specifically, Part III of the present thesis could show an increased 
novelty bias – that is, an enhanced distractibility especially towards new events – under 
positive affect with low arousal, thereby presenting first empirical evidence for a hypothesis 
suggested by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004). For an overview of all experiments presented 
here (including paradigm, cueing procedure, affect manipulation method, and most important 
results) see Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Overview of all experiments from the present thesis. 
 Paradigm Cueing Procedure Affect Manipulation Results 
Part I 
Experiment 1 Spatial response 
cueing task 
Informative response 
cues (66 % cue 
validity) 
IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
4 between-subjects affect groups: 
neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh vs. negativehigh 
Reduced CVE under positive affect with low 
arousal as compared to positive affect with high 
arousal in error rates (p < .05) as well as RTs 
(p = .059) 
General slowdown of RTs in the negativehigh as 
compared to the positivehigh affect group (p < .05) 
Experiment 2 Spatial response 
cueing task + 
increased working 
memory load 
Informative response 
cues (66 % cue 
validity) 
IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
3 between-subjects affect groups: 
neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh 
Reduced CVE in RTs in the positivelow as 
compared to the positivehigh (p < .05) and neutral 
affect group (p < .05) 
Part II 
Experiment 3 Spatial response 
cueing task 
Non-informative 
response cues (50 % 
cue validity) 
IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
3 between-subjects affect groups: 
neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh 
No affective modulation of the CVE 
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Table 5.1. (continued) Overview of all experiments from the present thesis. 
 Paradigm Cueing Procedure Affect Manipulation Results 
Experiment 4 Task Switching No-cue (1 block) vs. 
informative task cues 
(75 % cue validity, 
3 blocks) 
IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
3 between-subjects affect groups: 
neutral vs. positivelow vs. 
positivehigh 
No cue: No affective modulation of switch costs  
Informative cues: Reduced CVE in RTs in the 
positivelow as compared to the positivehigh affect 
group (p = .05) 
Experiment 5 Global-local task with 
global, local, and 
ambivalent targets 
Informative response 
cues (71.4 % cue 
validity, 3 blocks) vs. 
no-cue (1 block) 
IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
2 within-participants affect 
conditions: positivelow vs. 
positivehigh 
Informative cues: Reduced CVE in RTs under 
positive affect with low arousal as compared to 
positive affect with high arousal (p < .05), reverse 
response pattern in error rates 
No cues: No affective modulation 
Part III 
Experiment 6 Stroop-like word-
picture interference 
task with familiar vs. 
new distractors 
No cues IAPS pictures preceding every 
trial 
2 between-subjects affect groups: 
neutral vs. positivelow 
Increased novelty bias under positive affect: 
stronger interference by new distractors in the 
positivelow as compared to the neutral affect group 
(p < .05) 
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Taken together, results of the present thesis strongly recommend that future research 
on the modulation of cognitive control by positive affect should consider valence as well as 
arousal, differentiate between proactive and reactive control, and be aware of benefits as well 
as costs associated with different cognitive control strategies. Exceeding the previous 
discussions included in Parts I to III, some general topics – with respect to the original 
research presented here – concerning the influence of positive affect on cognitive control will 
be addressed in the following. 
 
 
5.1. Positive affect with low arousal reduces proactive control 
The experiments of the present thesis repeatedly found a reduced CVE under positive 
affect with low arousal, which converges with findings from previous studies by Compton et 
al. (2004) and Dreisbach (2006). While investigating associations between baseline mood 
state and performance in an attentional orienting task with informative cues, Compton et al. 
found no relationship between self-reported negative affect and attentional orienting 
performance, whereas high positive affect as compared to low positive affect was associated 
with a reduced CVE. Dreisbach (2006) used the AX-CPT and found enhanced performance in 
AY trials, that is, in invalidly cued trials, but impaired performance in BX and BY trials, that 
is, in validly cued trials, under positive affect (comparable to the low arousal conditions used 
here) as compared to neutral or negative affect. Thus in both studies, positive affect resulted 
in a benefit in expected events, but also in costs in unexpected events. These findings – like 
the present results – can be explained by a reduced usage of informative cues, which indicates 
a reduction in proactive control. However, a recent study by van Wouwe et al. (2011) – also 
using the AX-CPT – found no influence of positive affect on cue usage (no impairment in BX 
and BY trials), and hence proactive control, but, instead, differences between their positive 
and neutral affect group in reactive control: Participants in the positive affect group showed a 
performance benefit and ERP differences in AY trials only, where a pre-dominant response 
tendency had to be overcome. In line with these results are also several studies by Kuhl and 
colleagues (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999) that used 
paradigms without informative cues or predictable task orders, thus leaving no room for 
proactive control strategies. They used the Stroop task and a version of the global-local task 
(different to the one used here in Experiment 5) and found a reduction in Stroop interference 
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and a reduced global precedence under positive affect indicating also an enhanced ability to 
overcome predominant response tendencies. So overall, there is evidence for increased 
flexibility in form of a reduction in proactive control (this thesis; Compton et al., 2004; 
Dreisbach, 2006), but also evidence for increased flexibility in form of a modulation of 
reactive control (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999; van 
Wouwe et al., 2011).  
One reason for these mixed results might be differential affect induction procedures: 
The current studies (except for Experiment 5) manipulated affect in a between groups design 
with affective pictures preceding every trial – as was done also in the AX-CPT study by 
Dreisbach (2006) –, Compton et al. (2004) investigated differences in baseline mood state, 
van Wouwe et al. (2011) used emotional film clips prior to the actual experiment (for a more 
detailed discussion on differences between the two AX-CPT studies see van Wouwe et al., 
2011), and Kuhl and colleagues (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl 
& Kazen, 1999) used a within participants design with random presentation of positive, 
negative or neutral prime words preceding every trial. So, Compton et al. as well as van 
Wouwe et al. were concerned with effects of a sustained mood state – in the former case the 
currently existing mood state, in the latter case an induced mood state –, whereas Kuhl and 
colleagues investigated influences of rather transient affective reactions. The affect induction 
procedure used here and elsewhere (cf., Dreisbach 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) – 
affective pictures preceding every trial in a between groups design – most likely resulted in 
both transient and sustained affective reactions. IAPS pictures elicit typical emotional 
reactions very quickly with specific changes in cortical, autonomic, and facial activity, as well 
as evaluative ratings even with short presentation durations (Codispoti et al., 2001; Codispoti 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, repetitive exposure to pictures of the same valence leads to 
maintained or even sensitized affective reactions and can therefore be seen as a mood 
induction procedure (Bradley et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2005). Thus, it cannot be decided at 
this point, whether a sustained affective influence is really necessary, whether transient 
affective reactions alone might be sufficient, or whether it is the specific combination of both 
that is responsible for the specific positive affect effects found in Experiments 1 to 4. The 
fact, that Experiment 5 – that is, the only Experiment presented here using a within 
participants affect manipulation – showed an oppositional response pattern in RTs and error 
rates, which was not present in any of the previous experiments, suggest that differences in 
affect induction procedure might indeed be a relevant factor. But, of course, there are other 
procedural factors that might as well be crucial. For example, the reduced Stroop interference 
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found by Kuhl and colleagues was restricted to specific conditions, namely, when intention 
memory is activated (i.e., in the first of two consecutive Stroop tasks in a single trial; see Kuhl 
& Kazen, 1999) or when using specific positive primes related to achievement (see Kazen & 
Kuhl, 2005). Also, none of the above-quoted studies considered differences in arousal levels4
But, irrespective of the exact underlying mechanisms, the present Experiments 1 to 5 – 
in line with results from some previous studies (Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006) – 
showed converging evidence that positive affect specifically modulates proactive control: 
Only in situations, where performance could be optimized with a proactive control strategy – 
that is, when useful advance information was present (cf., Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007) – 
results revealed affective modulations, whereas reactive control was never influenced by 
positive affect (see Part II of the present thesis). More precisely, positive affect with low 
arousal repeatedly reduced the CVE when using paradigms including informative cues, 
thereby indicating less reliance on those cues. But, why is it that low arousing positive affect 
reduces proactive control? Intuitively, it seems to converge with our everyday experience: 
When being in a relaxed, mildly positive mood one tends to enjoy the moment without 
looking ahead. Moreover, this intuitive correspondence would also be in line with Carver’s 
coasting theory (2003). This theory assumes a feedback function of affect: More precisely, 
positive affect presumably signals better progress than necessary, and consequently reduces 
the effort invested in the ongoing task (= coasting). Proactive control in this sense is 
associated with more effort than reactive control, because it involves sustained maintenance 
of informative cues or task goals for an optimized behavior (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & 
Burgess, 2007). Applied to the present results, a reduction of proactive control could, thus, be 
a sign of coasting: Participants in the positivelow condition apply less effort in sustained task 
preparation, and instead rely on reactive control as soon as the target appears. Similar 
predictions would be made by Schwarz’s feelings-as-information theory (1990, 2012). 
Schwarz suggests that feelings are often used as a source of information with negative 
. 
In sum, the existing literature is characterized by mixed results, which might be due to 
different affect induction procedures – pictures vs. film clips vs. words, between vs. within, 
affect induction previous to vs. during the actual experiment –, differences in intention 
memory load, as well as different arousal levels. Therefore, future studies are clearly needed – 
with a systematic variation of these potential factors – to further clarify under which 
conditions positive affect influences proactive or reactive control. 
                                                     
4 But note that in the Dreisbach studies (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006) the positive IAPS 
pictures had low arousal levels comparable to the ones used in the present thesis. 
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feelings signaling threat or a lack of positive outcomes, whereas positive feelings signal a 
benign situation. This is assumed to result in corresponding processing strategies: Negative 
affect is a signal to be careful, which causes an analytic processing style. Positive affect, on 
the other hand, is a safety signal, thereby allowing less effortful strategies. So, following the 
same reasoning as before, the present results of a reduction in proactive control (i.e., the more 
effortful control strategy) under positive affect with low arousal would also be in line with the 
feelings-as-information theory. Taken together, reducing proactive control under low arousing 
positive affect seems to be a form of adaptive behavior, wherein positive affect might serve as 
feedback on goal progress (Carver, 2003) or as a safety signal (Schwarz, 1990, 2012). 
  
5.2. Diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal 
Experiments of Parts I and II showed clear-cut evidence for arousal differences within 
positive affect. Only positive affect in combination with low arousal resulted in a reduction of 
proactive control, whereas positive affect in combination with high arousal – if anything – 
seemed to even increase proactive control. First of all, these diverging results endorse the 
basic assumption of Russell’s circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980; Russell, 2003; 
Russell & Feldman-Barrett, 1999), namely, that each affective state is an inseparable 
combination of the two independent dimensions valence and arousal. Moreover, the results 
presented here emphasize that future research focusing on positive affect effects should not 
neglect arousal influences as was common procedure in a lot of previous studies. 
As already discussed above, the reduction of proactive control under positive affect 
with low arousal might serve an adaptive function in line with Carver’s coasting theory 
(2003) or Schwarz’s feelings-as-information theory (1990, 2012). But, why was this effect 
restricted to low arousal levels? In Schwarz’s theory, positive affect serves as a safety signal, 
which allows switching to less effortful strategies. Obviously, any high arousal signal might, 
however, rather serve as a warning or alertness signal. For example, Fuentes and Campoy 
(2008) showed in an attention network task that alerting tones increase the CVE, and inferred 
that alerting enhances the effect of informative cues. Furthermore, positive affect effects are 
assumed to be mediated by DA activity (cf., Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002), whereas 
arousal is associated primarily with NE activity (e.g., Grant, Aston-Jones, & Redmond, JR., 
1988; Rasmussen, Morilak, & Jacobs, 1986). According to the integrative LC-NE theory 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005a, 2005b; see also Chapter 1.2.2.) phasic LC-NE activity 
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promotes exploitative behavior, whereas tonic activity is associated with explorative behavior. 
Exploitative behavior helps to optimize task performance by enhancing task-related 
processing, while explorative behavior worsens current task performance and facilitates 
disengagement from a given task. In the present paradigms with informative cues, optimizing 
task performance means using the cues for response or task preparation, that is, using a 
proactive control strategy. So, applied to the present data, the short presentation of highly 
arousing positive pictures might have triggered phasic NE activity and thereby resulted in 
increased proactive control (i.e., exploitative behavior) and, as a consequence, an increased 
CVE. That is, arousal effects may have counteracted and outweighed the effects of positive 
affect in the positivehigh condition. This argumentation, of course, is mere speculation at this 
point, because the present thesis considered behavioral results only. Furthermore, Aston-Jones 
and Cohen’s LC-NE theory is based on animal studies (monkeys) and correlational in nature. 
First studies testing human subjects showed mixed results so far: A psychopharmacological 
study (Jepma, te Beek, Wagenmakers, van Gerven, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010) manipulated the 
LC-NE system via a selective NE reuptake inhibitors, which was, however, not followed by a 
predicted influence on explorative behavior. In contrast, two other studies (Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011) – measuring differences 
in baseline pupil diameter as an indicator of LC-NE activity (cf., Phillips, Szabadi, & 
Bradshaw, 2000; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1993) – could show indirect evidence 
for an association between exploitative or explorative behavior and LC-NE activity in humans 
as predicted by Aston-Jones and Cohen’s theory. Thus, to shed further light on the diverging 
effects of positive affect with low or high arousal future studies including functional markers 
– baseline pupil diameter for NE activity and for DA activity spontaneous EBR (cf., Elsworth 
et al., 1991; Dreisbach et al., 2005) or DA related gene polymorphisms (cf., Oak et al., 2000) 
(cf., Chapter 1.3.1.) – would be especially useful. 
Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms, one might in general criticize the 
conclusion of diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal due to the lack of 
significant differences compared to the (baseline) neutral affect group: In Experiments 1 and 
4, the CVE in the neutral group was descriptively between both positive groups, but there 
were no significant differences. Only Experiment 2 showed a significant reduction of the 
CVE in the positivelow group compared to the neutral group, but therein the magnitude of the 
CVE was equally high in the neutral and the positivehigh group. These rather subtle differences 
between neutral affect and the positive affect groups might be a byproduct of the special 
procedure used in the present experiments: Each experiment started with a short relaxation 
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exercise to create a similar baseline mood in all participants. This procedure, however, might 
already have resulted in a mild positive affect induction, thereby possibly reducing the 
differences between the neutral group and the positive group especially with low arousal. 
Admittedly, what speaks against this assumption is that in Experiment 2, the CVE of the 
neutral group actually resembled the positivehigh group. It is, however, conceivable that the 
higher task demands due to the additional math task have counteracted the relaxed mood in 
the neutral group. Thus, the significant difference found in Experiment 2 might in fact be 
closer to the actual difference between neutral affect and positive affect with low arousal. 
Also, it can be assumed that everyday mood is generally rather mildly positive than truly 
neutral. Therefore, it might not be too surprising that differences between mild positive affect 
and neutral affect are not easily detected (see also Posner et al., 2005, for a more general 
discussion concerning neutral affect control conditions). Having said that, the observed 
differences in the CVE between positive affect with low arousal and neutral affect and 
positive affect with high arousal provide sufficient evidence for the conclusion that positive 
affect with low arousal decreases proactive control, while positive affect with high arousal 
increases proactive control compared to neutral affect. 
 
 
5.3. Novelty bias and positive affect 
Experiment 6 of the present thesis succeeded in gathering empirical evidence for an 
increased novelty bias under positive affect with low arousal. That is, it was the first study 
directly addressing a specific hypothesis suggested by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) in their 
study on the modulatory influence of positive affect on cognitive control. In line with 
Goschke’s stability-flexibility framework of cognitive control (2003) they found evidence for 
reduced perseveration (= increased flexibility) as well as increased distractibility under 
positive affect in a cognitive set-switching task. This was interpreted as indication of an 
increased novelty bias under positive affect, because performance benefits were found, when 
participants had to switch to a new task dimension (perseveration condition), and performance 
costs, when novel distractors had to be ignored (learned irrelevance condition). Taken 
together, the results from present Experiment 6 and from Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) 
might help explaining some mixed results in the existing literature on positive affect effects 
(cf., review by Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), because such an increased novelty bias results in 
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costs or benefits depending on whether new events are task-irrelevant or task-relevant in a 
given situation. 
Furthermore, these findings seem to fit with neuropsychological theories of positive 
affect, cognitive control processes and PFC functions (Ashby et al., 1999, 2002; Cohen et al., 
2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001). An adaptive dopaminergic gating mechanism is assumed to 
regulate updating of representations in PFC (Cohen et al., 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; see 
also Chapter 1.2.2.), and the modulation of cognitive control by positive affect is also 
supposed to be mediated via DA activity in prefrontal cortical areas (Ashby et al., 1999, 
2002). Thus, applied to the present results, positive IAPS pictures might have caused a mild 
increase in phasic DA activity, which promoted updating in PFC, thereby resulting in an 
increased novelty bias. Again, this argumentation is limited by the fact that Experiment 6 
considered behavioral data only, but there are other studies (Dreisbach et al., 2005; Müller et 
al., 2007; Tharp & Pickering, 2011) showing more direct evidence for the modulatory 
influence of DA in this respect: Using the same paradigm as Dreisbach & Goschke (2004) 
these studies found the same response pattern for participants with higher central DA activity 
– indicated by functional markers of DA activity (e.g., spontaneous EBR) – as in the positive 
affect group of the original study. 
On a more general level, results of Experiment 6 are in line with theories that stress 
the functional value of positive affect (Carver, 2003; Fredrickson, 1998). As already described 
above, in Carver’s coasting theory positive affect is assumed to serve as feedback, signaling 
better than expected progress in the current task. As a consequence, effort in this task will be 
reduced, which is called coasting. Carver, furthermore, suggests that coasting promotes 
exploration (“Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else”, p. 241), which has the 
adaptive value of facilitating the detection of unexpected opportunities. Obviously, increased 
exploratory behavior should be accompanied by an increased susceptibility to novel stimuli. 
Thus, the increased novelty bias under positive affect with low arousal might be a sign of 
coasting – like the reduction of proactive control (see discussion above) –, which is especially 
advantageous, whenever novel events are associated with benefits. The increased novelty bias 
under positive affect with low arousal also seems to fit with Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build 
model of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998). The basic assumption in this model is that 
positive emotions arise in situations perceived as safe or saturated, that is, free from threat or 
acute needs. Therefore, positive affective states – in contrast to negative affective states – 
permit a broadening of the individual’s thought-action repertoire, which results, for example, 
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in increased exploratory behavior. So, following the same reasoning as before, the increased 
novelty bias found under positive affect with low arousal (see Experiment 6) also fits with 
Fredrickson’s theory. Whereas Carver’s coasting theory only considers short-term effects of 
positive affect, Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build model, furthermore, includes assumptions 
about long-term effects. An increase of exploratory behavior can result in learning new skills 
or behaviors. That is, positive emotions are assumed to be evolutionary adaptive in the long 
run by building new resources, which outlive the transient affective states. Obviously, such an 
increase in personal resources (behavioral as well as cognitive) facilitates adaptive behavior in 
a complex, dynamically changing environment. 
The original focus of Part III of the present thesis was on the behavioral costs of 
positive affect. Following the flexibility-stability framework of cognitive control (Goschke, 
2003)  as well as the DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007), an increase in 
flexibility under positive affect – repeatedly shown in the literature and in the present 
experiments – was assumed to be accompanied by costs in form of increased distractibility, 
especially to novel stimuli. So far, however, the discussion of this increased novelty bias 
under positive affect illustrates that such a black-and-white account – with flexibility as 
beneficial and distractibility as detrimental – is an inadequate simplification. Both flexibility 
and distractibility seem to be two sides of the same coin, which depending on the given 
situation might result in costs or benefits (cf., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), and might even 
be altogether beneficial from a long-term perspective (cf. Fredrickson, 1998). 
 
 
5.4. Positive affect versus reward: Differentiating emotion and 
motivation 
Exceeding the discussion above on the importance of further research on diverging 
effects of different affect induction procedures (see Chapter 5.1.), one related caveat shall be 
addressed in the following. The existing literature so far often made no differentiation 
between reward and positive affect based on the fact that reward typically is accompanied by 
positive affective reactions. For example, Ashby and colleagues’ (1999) hypothesis on DA 
mediating the cognitive effects of positive affect is derived from research showing that reward 
is associated with DA activity. However, some recent studies (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, 
Notebaert, & Roggeman, 2012; Dreisbach, 2006; Locke & Braver, 2008; van Steenbergen et 
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al., 2009; van Steenbergen et al., 2010) have illustrated diverging effects of positive affect and 
reward on cognitive control: Dreisbach (2006) as well as Locke and Braver (2008) used an 
AX-CPT paradigm, but Dreisbach manipulated affect via IAPS pictures preceding every trial, 
whereas Locke and Braver manipulated reward by giving monetary incentives, when 
participants RTs were faster than their median RT in a baseline condition. In the Dreisbach 
study, positive affect resulted in benefits in unexpected events (i.e., AY trials) and costs in 
expected events (i.e., BX and BY trials), which can be interpreted as a reduction in 
maintenance capability and proactive control. In contrast, Locke and Braver observed a 
reversed response pattern indicating increased maintenance capability and proactive control 
following reward. Likewise, Braem and colleagues (2012) as well as van Steenbergen and 
colleagues (2009, 2010) observed oppositional effects of reward and positive affect on 
conflict adaptation effects using both an Erikson flanker paradigm. Van Steenbergen et al. 
manipulated positive affect – once with performance non-contingent smilies during the 
experiment indicating a monetary gain (2009), and once with a mood induction procedure 
combining imagination and music (2010) –, and  found both times reduced conflict adaptation 
under positive affect. In contrast, Braem et al. manipulated reward – by including 25 % trials 
with performance-related reward cues, where participants could win a monetary gain, if they 
responded correct and faster than 1000 ms – and found increased conflict adaptation in reward 
trials. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that positive affect and reward appear to be 
accompanied by exactly opposite modulations of cognitive control. 
As such, two recent reviews on this topic (Chiew & Braver, 2011; Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012b) emphasize the importance of differentiating between emotional (i.e., 
affective) and motivational influences (i.e., reward) on cognitive control. Experimental 
procedures that manipulate subjective affective experience only (e.g., via exposure to 
affective stimuli) have to be distinguished from procedures that use motivational 
manipulations (e.g., via performance-contingent incentives). Chiew and Braver speculate that 
positive affect and reward might indeed both be associated with DA activity, while their 
diverging influences may be due to dissociable modes of DA activity: Tonic versus phasic 
DA activation and/or D1 versus D2 receptor dominated states may be the underlying 
mechanisms (cf., Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). Moreover, 
Dreisbach and Fischer theorize that positive affect and reward might have diverging effects on 
intrinsic reinforcement signals: Especially in cognitively demanding tasks correct responses 
are associated with activation in the ventral striatum, which is assumed to act as an intrinsic 
motivational signal (cf., Satterthwaite et al., 2012). Performance contingent reward might 
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enhance this intrinsic reinforcement signal thereby increasing proactive control and conflict 
adaptation (cf., Braem et al., 2012; Locke & Braver, 2008), while positive affect, in contrast, 
might counteract and outweigh this signal thereby reducing proactive control and conflict 
adaptation (cf., Dreisbach, 2006; van Steenbergen et al., 2009; van Steenbergen et al., 2010). 
Therefore, current researchers on positive affect effects should be most careful in planning 
their affect inductions procedures, because any confound with a reward manipulation will 
make it extremely difficult to interpret the results. 
Interestingly, the diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal found in 
the present thesis seem to parallel the diverging effects of positive affect and reward reported 
in the literature: Positive affect in combination with high arousal like performance-contingent 
reward has been shown to increase proactive control (cf., present Experiments 1-5; Locke 
& Braver, 2008), whereas positive affect with low arousal reduced proactive control (cf., 
present Experiments 1-5; Dreisbach, 2006). Moreover, it was discussed above that highly 
arousing positive affect effects might be mediated via NE activity (see Chapter 5.2.), which 
perfectly fits with the idea that an NE modulated learning signal might account for the reward 
effects (Braem et al., 2012). Thus, positive affect in combination with high arousal might 
possibly have an additional motivational effect that is not present under positive affect with 
low arousal. Again, future research would be most interesting and important to clarify, 
whether indeed similar underlying mechanisms could be responsible for the influences of 
reward and positive affect with high arousal on cognitive control. 
In sum, the existing literature together with the present results illustrate that even 
though there is considerable progress in understanding how positive affect modulates 
cognitive control, there is still a long way to go: (1) Effects of positive affect have proven to 
be much more specific than classic theories suggested. For example, Part I of the present 
thesis showed diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal, and Part II 
revealed that positive affect specifically modulates proactive control, whereas no impact on 
reactive control was found. Further investigations regarding the specificity of positive affect 
effects would be helpful for clarifying underlying mechanisms and updating of existing 
theories. (2) Furthermore, positive affect per se seems to be much more specific than 
previously thought as can be seen in the oppositional effects of positive affect and reward (see 
short review above), or in mixed results associated with different affect induction procedures 
(cf., chapter 5.1.). Therefore, it would be another interesting and important prospective line of 
research to further specify and clarify the concept of positive affect. (3) And, last but not least, 
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it would be most interesting as well as highly desirable to gain further insight into the 
functionality of positive affect, since even ostensible behavioral costs – like the increased 
novelty bias found in Part III – can turn out to be of adaptive value on closer inspection (see 
chapter 5.3.). 
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusion 
Results from the present thesis revealed that the hypothesis of increased cognitive 
flexibility under positive affect (cf., Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby et al., 2002) oversimplifies the 
modulatory influence of positive affect on cognitive control: First of all, in line with Russell’s 
circumplex model of affect (1980), research on positive affect should always consider both 
dimensions of affect – namely, valence and arousal – as the present studies repeatedly showed 
diverging effects of positive affect with low or high arousal levels. Second, differentiating 
between proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007) 
resulted in the new finding that positive affect specifically modulates proactive control. More 
precisely, positive affect with low arousal reduced proactive control, while positive affect 
with high arousal seems to increase proactive control. That is, specifically low arousing 
positive affect increases flexibility in form of an enhanced independence from context 
information. Finally, fitting with current theories on cognitive control (cf., Braver, 2012; 
Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Goschke, 2003), the present thesis showed that this increased 
flexibility under low arousing positive affect is associated with behavioral costs in form of 
increased distractibility, especially towards new events. In sum, these specific modulations of 
cognitive control endorse existing theories on the functionality of positive affect (cf., Carver, 
2003; Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz, 1990, 2012): Therein, positive affect is assumed to 
support adaptive behavior in a constantly changing environment by increasing flexibility and 
susceptibility towards new events, which facilitates the utilization of unforeseen 
opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 8 Appendix 
8.1. Appendix A 
Overview of the selection of IAPS pictures used for affect manipulation in the present 
studies. 
 
Table A1. Numbers of selected IAPS pictures used in Experiments 1 to 6. 
 Affect group 
 neutral positivelow positivehigh negativehigh neutral2 
IAPS-No. 
7000 1440 5260 2800 1390 
7004 1710 5621 3030 1560 
7006 1750 5623 3064 1616 
7009 1920 5626 3071 1945 
7035 2057 5629 3100 2200 
7040 2150 8161 3110 2372 
7080 2260 8180 3120 2410 
7090 2311 8190 9433 2575 
7175 2340 8200 9570 5395 
7233 2530 8490 9571 5535 
Note. neutral2 = alternative neutral affect picture set used in Experiment 6, which was matched to the 
positivelow set in arousal levels as well as in number of pictures depicting animals 
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8.2. Appendix B 
Results of the speed-accuracy analysis for RTs and error rates of Experiment 5. 
 
Table B1. Individual correlations between RTs and error rates for trials with global or local targets in 
the cued global-local task of Experiment 5. 
Subject r 
1 .346 
2 .192 
3 .716* 
4 .058 
5 .820** 
6 .072 
7 .582 
8 -.550 
9 .320 
10 .494 
11 .442 
12 -.344 
13 -.511 
14 -.643* 
15 .161 
16 .558 
17 -.302 
18 .842** 
19 -.595 
20 .535 
21 .110 
22 .718* 
23 .287 
24 -.357 
25 .371 
26  – a 
27 .667* 
28 -.303 
29 -.358 
30 .215 
 Note. r = Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for corresponding pairs of mean RTs and 
error rates (as a factor of Affect, Cue validity, and Target type) 
a No correlation coefficient could be calculated for Subject 26, because this participant did not commit 
errors in any factor combination. 
* p < .05, one-tailed. ** p < .01, one-tailed. 
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8.3. Appendix C 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for RT and error rates analyses of Experiment 6 
including the entire sample of 48 participants (24 in neutral, 24 in positive affect group). 
 
Table C1. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the word-picture interference task of 
Experiment 6 (SD in parentheses) as a factor of Affect group, Distractor type, and Distractor compatibility. 
 
Affect group 
 neutral positive 
Distractor familiar new familiar new 
 RT (SD) 
compatible 561 (60.6) 619 (88.3) 561 (73.0) 650 (134.5) 
incompatible 579 (66.8) 629 (87.2) 588 (96.7) 654 (110.4) 
 Errors (SD) 
compatible 2.95 (2.94) 4.16 (5.49) 3.2 (2.17) 3.82 (7.37) 
incompatible 4.63 (3.52) 2.77 (4.7) 5.14 (2.47) 4.16 (5.49) 
 
 
Table C2. ANOVA results for RT data as a factor of Affect group, Distractor type, and Distractor 
compatibility. 
Source dfs F p ηp2 
 Main effects 
 between 
Affect (A) 1, 46 0.47 .498 .01 
 within 
Distractor type (T) 1, 46 78.22 < .001 .63 
Distractor compatibility (C) 1, 46 5.49 < .05 .107 
 Interactions 
A x T 1, 46 2.52 .119 .052 
A x C 1, 46 0.01 .924 < .001 
T x C 1, 46 1.31 .258 .028 
A x T x C 1, 46 0.37 .546 .008 
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Table C2. ANOVA results for error rates data as a factor of Affect group, Distractor type, and 
Distractor compatibility. 
Source dfs F p ηp2 
 Main effects 
 between 
Affect (A) 1, 46 0.22 .647 .005 
 within 
Distractor type (T) 1, 46 0.18 .675 .004 
Distractor compatibility (C) 1, 46 2.22 .143 .046 
 Interactions 
A x T 1, 46 0.02 .903 < .001 
A x C 1, 46 1.32 .257 .028 
T x C 1, 46 5.08 < .05 .099 
A x T x C 1, 46 0.5 .483 .011 
 
 
